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CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION OVERSIGHT: 
RULES v. STANDARDS 
Philip T. Hackney * 
Abstract 
Congress has traditionally utilized standards as a means of 
communicating charitable tax law in the Code. In the past fifteen years, 
however, Congress has increasingly turned to rules to stop fraud and abuse 
in the charitable sector. I review the rules versus standards debate to 
evaluate this trend. Are congressional rules the best method for regulating 
the charitable sector? While the complex changing nature of charitable 
purpose would suggest standards are better, the inadequacy of IRS 
enforcement and the large number of unsophisticated charitable 
organizations both augur strongly in favor of rules. Congress, however, is 
not the ideal institution to implement rules for charitable purpose. The IRS 
is the better institution generally to institute rules there because of its 
informational advantage over Congress. Additionally, the IRS can implement 
rules in a more flexible rule format than can Congress. Still, Congress as a 
rulemaker makes sense in a few scenarios: (1) where it implements 
transparent procedural requirements; (2) where it regulates discrete 
behavior of charitable organization acts; and, (3) where it intends to remove 
a set of organizations from charitable status through simple rules. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a June 2006 press release Senator Charles Grassley lamented that 
“some individuals are exploiting vagueness or silence in or a lack of 
enforcement of the laws governing tax-exempt groups to enrich themselves 
rather than serve the public.”1 Soon after that press release, Senator Grassley 
inserted a series of narrow yet significant and complex legal changes to the 
law of tax-exempt charitable organizations into the Pension Protection Act 
of 2006 (“PPA”).2 After the PPA, Senator Grassley sponsored legislation 
regarding charitable nonprofit hospitals that Congress enacted as part of the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).3 
Although these laws applied to a variety of organizational types, they 
all used technical rules to stop abuses of the charitable sector.4 I examine this 
trend to evaluate whether it is a positive move for charitable organization 
oversight. I look to the literature on rules and standards,5 and conclude that 
Congress should primarily enact standards and permit the IRS to develop the 
specific rules.6 Not only does the IRS have the expertise, but it also has the 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Grassley Solicits IRS Comment, Urges Enforcement 
on Series of Problems in the Tax-Exempt Arena (June 1, 2006), http://www.finance.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/chairman/release/?id=022c68f3-f4fd-4752-a120-5448b9528ea4. 
2 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 1211–1245, 120 Stat. 780, 1094–1102. 
3 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
4 Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 70 
(2011) (identifies this trend and argues it is a result of relying on one simple standard for too large a sector 
and too many different benefits). Others contend that IRS oversight is such a mess that we should strongly 
consider pulling enforcement responsibility from the IRS and provide it to a new independent agency. 
Lloyd H. Mayer, “The Better Part of Valour Is Discretion”: Should the IRS Change or Surrender Its 
Oversight of Tax Exempt Organizations, ___ COLUM. J. TAX L. ___ (forthcoming 2016). 
5 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 
YALE L.J. 576 (2014); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 
(1983) (discussing how to best design rules); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis 
of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 585 (1993); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (2002); Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995). 
6 Admittedly, historically, Congress, the U.S. Dept. of the Treas., and the IRS have overseen 
charitable tax law in just this way. Professor Colinvaux argues that this approach has led to a vast unwieldy 
charitable sector and an oversight mess. Colinvaux, supra note 4, at 6. He argues that this standard-based 
system led to scandals that can only be cured by a restructuring of the way we regulate charity at the 
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flexibility to respond to changing conditions. Adopting rules to define 
charitable purpose at the statutory level is likely to lead to harmfully 
overinclusive and underinclusive rules. It also is likely to make the regime 
more difficult for the IRS to administer,7 and for a mostly unsophisticated 
nonprofit sector to navigate. I also contend that the IRS should use more 
flexible rulemaking, such as revenue rulings and revenue procedures, instead 
of less flexible regulations. Nevertheless, Congress should consider rules in 
a few instances: (1) where a process might credibly be thought to improve 
charitable behavior; (2) where it can regulate a discrete act common to all 
charitable organizations; and, (3) where it can eliminate a sector of charitable 
organizations with a simple rule. 
This article arose out of a symposium to address whether the regulation 
of charitable organizations is broken and, if so, whether it can be fixed. In 
addressing this question, we must first identify a problem. Because the 
problem is large in scope, this article identifies a relatively narrow one—the 
effectiveness of tax legislation regarding charitable organizations.8 This 
article asks three questions: (1) what type of legal commands should govern 
                                                                                                                           
 
federal level. Id. He also contends that the recent congressional legislation is only a symptom of a failed 
system. Id. at 8. I do not contend here that charitable oversight has been ideal. I only contend that some 
recent congressional rule-based legislation is likely to make the situation worse rather than better. Whether 
the charitable tax system itself should be chopped up and divided based on the governmental benefit 
provided, as Colinvaux suggests, is beyond the scope of this article. However, I do believe we should 
think broadly in the way Colinvaux recommends; but, I caution, that the rules/standards challenge 
discussed in this paper should be kept in mind in any such reenvisioning. Also, this Article does not make 
the claim that Congress should enact standards throughout the Code because of its complexity and the 
changing nature of society. Nevertheless, some have called for Congress to delegate more rulemaking to 
the IRS and other related agencies to reap the benefit of the expertise of the IRS. See James R. Hines, Jr. 
& Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax 10 (Univ. of Michigan Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 391, 
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402047. 
7 See David Weisbach, Cost of Departures from Formalism: Formalism in Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 860 (1999) (arguing that in contexts where there are thousands of possible complex permutations of 
a law, a rule based regime can make the law particularly complex); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-15-420R, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: OBSERVATIONS ON IRS OPERATIONS, PLANNING, 
AND RESOURCES (2015) (describing the severe lack of resources under which the IRS at current operates); 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., I.R.S., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2014) (detailing the 
particularly severe resource problem of the exempt organizations division of the IRS—the division that 
oversees charitable organizations). 
8 Although some lament the federalization of charitable oversight, it is quite clear that Congress, 
the IRS, and federal courts have federalized charitable oversight. See generally Mark L. Ascher, 
Federalization of the Law of Charity, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1581 (2014). 
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charitable organizations in the tax arena—rules or standards, (2) if rules are 
needed, who should develop those rules, and (3) what form should those rules 
take? 
In the rules versus standards debate, a rule is typically defined as a legal 
command that determines a case before an act, while a standard is a legal 
command that requires an adjudicator to make a determination after an act.9 
In considering whether to enact a rule or a standard some scholars focus on 
where it is most efficient to generate the information needed for a good rule.10 
The choice to use a rule or a standard affects the complexity and costs of 
enforcing a particular regime, the likelihood of compliance, and raises issues 
of the rule of law and democracy.11 Finally, separate and apart from questions 
of efficiency or democracy is the question of which type of legal command 
is more likely to achieve justice. 
The biggest problem with rules is that they tend to generate legal 
commands that are both overinclusive and underinclusive.12 By 
overinclusive, I mean that the rule will prohibit activities the lawmakers did 
not intend to prohibit. By underinclusive, I mean that the rule will fail to 
prohibit activities the lawmakers intended to prohibit. Standards may be 
superior where that underinclusive and overinclusiveness arises because of 
technical detail, quickly changing circumstances, or highly complex factual 
situations. Rules are likely to be superior on any issue that repeats often and 
is universal. Underinclusion and overinclusion are likely very tolerable in 
such a situation. 
Regarding the first question above, the factors point in two different 
directions. Standards are superior to rules for two reasons: (1) the legal 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 This is a simplification chosen because it helps in analyzing this question at its simplest level. 
Anyone who is familiar with law realizes that these legal commands can come in all shapes and sizes. 
Some possibilities include factors, standards, presumptions, guidelines, principles or analogies. Each of 
these legal forms possesses both advantages and disadvantages. Some scholars have begun to look at the 
advantages and disadvantages with some of these methods of developing law. See, e.g., Susan Morse, 
Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2016).  
10 Kaplow, supra note 5, at 585. 
11 SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 159 (discussing the fact that rules allocate power, and that there is 
often a concern that failing to pass rules allows unelected judges to make the rules rather than allow the 
democracy to make the rules). 
12 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 31–34. 
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concept of a charitable organization calls for an analysis of every fact 
associated with a particular organization over a year period; and (2) the ideal 
notion of “charitable” expressed by Congress changes over time as 
technology and society changes. These factors require a complex legal 
analysis and make good rules difficult to formulate. Four factors suggest 
rules might be superior: (1) there are a large number of charitable 
organizations, (2) there is a significant amount of money in the sector, 
(3) IRS resources to oversee the sector are minimal, and (4) a large portion 
of the charitable sector is unsophisticated. In weighing these conflicting 
factors a need to make the system workable seems paramount and therefore 
some level of rules make good sense. 
Regarding the second question, Congress is the generally the wrong 
institutional player to enact rules to define charitable purpose.13 Because the 
IRS can modify, adjust, and perfect rules utilizing information gained 
through daily case-by-case analysis, the IRS is much more likely to develop 
rules that will not be harmfully underinclusive and overinclusive. Because it 
works daily with the charitable sector, the IRS is likely to have better current 
information regarding the particular organizational types applying than is 
Congress. Additionally, the IRS is constantly evaluating the state of 
charitable law providing it a greater flexibility, and responsiveness, to the 
changing nature of charitable tax law than Congress. Nevertheless, there are 
circumstances where Congress is likely a good institution to implement rules. 
Congress should make rules regarding discrete acts that cross all charitable 
organizations. It may also be a good institution from which to design simple 
rules of process. Finally, where it can eliminate a category of charitable 
organizations with a simple rule, it should consider acting. 
As to the third question, the IRS should primarily communicate rules 
through revenue rulings, and other lower-level guidance items, rather than 
regulations. This tends to be the historical practice of Congress and the IRS 
in implementing policy in the charitable sector. Once in place, legislation and 
regulations are much harder to change, increasing the potential disconnect 
between the state of the law on the books and appropriate outcomes. Lower 
level guidance such as revenue rulings and revenue procedures tend to be 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 This part strongly implicates a question of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to 
an agency. More work is needed to fully assess the wisdom of where to properly place this rulemaking 
authority. However, this analysis based on rules and standards theory does strongly suggest that Congress 
is not the ideal institutional player for this work. 
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easier to change. This strategy will maintain the information and flexibility 
advantage of the IRS in rulemaking, but also provide a satisfactory level of 
certainty. 
Admittedly, there are problems with this plan. It leaves a high degree of 
discretion to unelected bureaucrats, and it might lessen reliance and stability, 
two important components of a rule-based regime.14 While many might 
object to the suggested high degree of discretion granted to the Service here 
as anti-democratic,15 Congress, the President, and the courts have the ability 
to check the Service’s rulemaking.16 This should alleviate in part such 
democratic concerns. Additionally, regular guidance from the IRS through 
revenue rulings could balance taxpayer needs for reliance and stability 
against the equally important need for flexibility and good information.17 
A further implication of this analysis is that the IRS and the Treasury 
Department should put a significant amount of its resources towards 
implementing rules. Many commentators believe that the IRS has not 
provided enough charitable tax law guidance over the past twenty years.18 
Under this analysis, the IRS would be wise to spend its resources primarily 
on revenue rulings and revenue procedures rather than on much more time 
consuming regulations. 
In light of these normative conclusions, this article reviews and critiques 
EO legislation regarding credit counseling organizations, supporting 
organizations, and hospitals. Congress employed relatively detailed rules for 
each of these legislative actions in order to stem perceived abuses by many 
in those industry sectors. These complex rules should prove to be harmful to 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 155–58. 
15 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 606 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(stating that he is concerned about the authority granted to the IRS to determine fundamental public policy 
presumably from a concern about the democratic implications). 
16 See Hines & Logue, supra note 6 (making the case that providing delegation authority to the IRS 
is not that anti-democratic because of the checks of Congress, but also the fact that the President is elected 
and ultimately controls the rulemaking at the agency level). 
17 This article leaves to another article whether the IRS should follow Administrative Procedure 
Act requirements of notice and comment in enacting revenue rulings and procedures, as well as the correct 
level of deference courts should extend to these IRS guidance items, in the charitable organization realm. 
See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013). 
18 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 4. 
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the oversight of this sector by imposing rules that will be both underinclusive 
and overinclusive, overly complicated for both organizations and IRS 
enforcement, and likely to take away the flexibility of the Service in 
overseeing the charitable sector. 
This Article raises a number of separate but related issues. The question 
of who should develop rules—Congress or an agency—raises the question of 
the delegation power of Congress. The delegation debate is quite similar to 
the rules v. standards debate. The two focus on questions of democracy and 
which institution is most likely to have the best ability from an informational 
perspective to get the law right. Those who argue for broad delegation argue 
(1) that agencies have greater knowledge and expertise than their 
congressional counterpart, and (2) the agency process can ensure the law gets 
made. Those who argue against broad delegation claim that agency based law 
is less legitimate and less accountable than law made by Congress.19 The 
delegation debate also raises questions about agency discretionary power,20 
and the legal validity of the form of rulemaking for which this Article 
advocates: non-regulatory modes of guidance.21 Because this latter issue is 
particularly messy and challenging, but highly important to the question of 
how effective less formal guidance might be, I hope to address this matter of 
delegation and tax exempt charitable organization guidance in a separate 
article. 
Part II of this article reviews charitable tax law. It also examines in detail 
the changes made to that law over the past fifteen years with a focus on three 
particular rule changes through legislation including: (1) credit counseling 
organizations; (2) hospitals; and (3) supporting organizations. Part III 
reviews the literature regarding rules and standards. Part IV considers the 
implications of the rules and standards literature on (1) whether rules or 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 For a discussion of these issues, see Hines & Logue, supra note 6; Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); 
Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
775 (1999); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993). 
20 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); see also Philip T. Hackney, Should the 
IRS Never “Target” Taxpayers: An Examination of the IRS Tea Party Affair, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 453 
(2015) (considering the degree of discretion granted to the IRS by Congress over its determination 
function). 
21 See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 17, at 471 (examining the legal force of “I.R.B. guidance” such 
as revenue rulings). 
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standards should be enacted for charitable tax law, (2) if rules should be 
implemented, who should implement them, and (3) what form those rules 
should take. Part V applies this analysis to critique the chosen pieces of recent 
tax-exempt legislation. Part VI concludes. 
II. CHARITABLE TAX LAW 
A. What Is the Rationale of Charitable Tax Law? 
At a basic level, the primary purpose of charitable tax law must be to 
ensure that individuals all bear the proper income tax burden. In other words, 
it is aimed at helping to define the income tax base. The initial justification 
for charitable tax exemption held that we provide a subsidy to organizations 
that provide a public benefit that is at least equal to the tax given up. This 
some public benefit justification has little content though. Efforts have been 
made to define that necessary public benefit. The most accepted theory is 
Hansmann’s market failure theory that posits we should provide tax 
exemption to those organizations that are providing a public good or solving 
an important contract failure.22 Some have suggested that encouraging 
altruism is a sufficient good in itself,23 while others have contended that 
charitable organizations simply do not have income to speak of.24 There does 
seem to be consensus that the income of charitable organizations is generally 
not a part of the tax base. 
However, because of the role that the IRS plays in reviewing charitable 
organizations nationally, many also see the role of the IRS as a regulator of 
the charitable sector.25 Whether it is a legitimate rationale or not, Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income 
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981). 
23 Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990). Others have 
suggested that it is important to consider distributive justice concerns as much as efficiency and pluralism 
concerns emphasized by other scholars. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax 
Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010). 
24 Boris Bittker & George Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal 
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). 
25 John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) 
(discussing the regulatory function of the income tax exempt organization system); see also Hackney, 
supra note 20 (arguing that one justification for charitable tax exemption might be to regulate charitable 
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uses charitable tax law to regulate the charitable sector. This means there are 
at least two primary purposes of charitable tax law that our legislature might 
intend. The first focuses on making value judgments about organizations that 
are worthy of not paying taxes; the second focuses on making value 
judgments about whether a particular act is charitable in nature. This is a 
combination of the support and equity functions of the tax-exempt system 
identified by Simon, Chisholm and Dale.26 
There is, too, another purpose that charitable tax law arguably serves: to 
enhance pluralism.27 Justice Powell spoke clearly about this role in a 
concurrence in Bob Jones University. 
As Justice Brennan has observed, private, nonprofit groups receive tax exemptions 
because “each group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and 
enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.” Far from representing an 
effort to reinforce any perceived “common community conscience,” the provision 
of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of limiting the 
influence of governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life.28 
Continuing in this vein, Burton Weisbrod has argued that the nonprofit 
sector is useful to solve government failure to provide public goods at an 
optimal level.29 Because the government will only provide for the needs of 
the median voter, nonprofits can provide the services and needs of those on 
                                                                                                                           
 
organizations). However, states are generally expected to regulate charitable organizations. Thus, some 
scholars find the idea that the IRS might engage in the regulation of charitable organizations to be 
problematic. See, e.g., James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance 
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 548–49 (2010). 
26 Simon et al., supra note 25. 
27 See LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 8–9 (1992); David A. 
Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption-Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race 
Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 15 (2006); cf. Philip Hackney, Taxing the Unheavenly 
Chorus: Why Section 501(c)(6) Trade Associations Are Undeserving of Tax Exemption, 92 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 265 (2015) (questioning whether tax exemption always enhances pluralism). 
28 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 
U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
29 BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 66–67 
(1977). 
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the margins.30 If in fact our charitable organizations are fulfilling this 
pluralistic goal, we should expect charitable tax law to change rather than to 
stay static. 
Pluralism posits that society is made up of many interests whose needs 
can be satisfied through political means.31 Groups form to represent interests, 
such as business or labor. Those groups then request that the government 
provide certain goods and services. As David Truman envisioned, this system 
works in waves.32 As one interest is fulfilled, another interest will arise 
seeking to take back something that was lost to the other group. Thus, through 
time, we should see new and different groups forming in this pluralistic 
fashion. In fact, if we accept that pluralism should be a part of our goal for 
charitable tax law, we should also build a law that is flexible enough to accept 
such changes in our political and social life. Otherwise, the system will in 
fact not support pluralism. 
B. Tax Exempt Charitable Organization Law 
When Congress enacted the Income Tax in 1913, it included an 
exemption from income tax for charitable organizations.33 This exemption 
can also be found in earlier iterations of the income tax and the corporate 
income tax in the United States.34 Congress absolved entities with a particular 
organizational structure and purpose from an obligation to pay the income 
tax, but required all other persons and entities to pay tax on income whether 
at the organizational level35 or at the individual level.36 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 WEISBROD, supra note 29, at 66–67; cf. Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777, 803 (2012) (arguing that Weisbrod’s theory based on the median voter 
ignores public choice theory which posits that the median voter does not always control). 
31 SCOTT H. AINSWORTH, ANALYZING INTEREST GROUPS 5 (2001). 
32 DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 59 (1951). 
33 Tariff Act, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). 
34 For a history of the corporate income tax and exemptions therefrom, see Philip T. Hackney, What 
We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115, 131–35 (2013). 
35 I.R.C. § 11. 
36 Id. § 1. 
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Although most Americans probably think that the Code consists solely 
of detailed rules, in fact Congress has generally employed broad standards in 
the Code to govern charitable organizations. To be described in § 501(c)(3), 
an organization must (1) meet a certain organizational form; (2) be organized 
and operated exclusively for a charitable purpose; and (3) prohibit the 
inurement of net earnings to any private shareholder or individual.37 Later, 
Congress added a prohibition on engaging in more than a substantial amount 
of lobbying38 and completely prohibited the intervening in a political 
campaign.39 While some of § 501(c)(3) works in a rule-like manner, arguably 
(1) and (3) above, the heart of § 501(c)(3) is the mandate to operate 
exclusively for a charitable purpose. On this issue, Congress provided no 
explicit guidance in legislative history or otherwise. It established a standard 
with the flexibility of the common law legal concept of charity.40 
The IRS provides some modest content to the standard in regulations by 
defining charitable,41 educational,42 scientific,43 and other related terms. 
However, it has primarily stayed at the broad standard level in its regulations. 
For instance, the IRS states that the term charitable has the meaning given 
“in its generally accepted legal sense.”44 The IRS often interprets this choice 
to mean that it adopted the broad standard developed under the law of 
charitable trusts.45 The IRS typically includes examples in its regulations that 
provide some rules; however, many complain that those examples only 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 Id. § 501(c)(3). 
38 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-29-05, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF 
THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2005). 
39 Id. at 59. 
40 John P. Persons et al., Criteria for Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS: 
SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 1909, 1921–22 
(1977). 
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2014). 
42 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). 
43 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5). 
44 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). 
45 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (1969) (turning to the law of charitable trusts to 
determine the meaning of charitable in its “generally accepted legal sense of the word”). 
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illustrate the very clear situations that no one would question anyway. This 
means that the examples often do little work to define charitable purpose. 
While the Code and regulations regarding charitable organizations have 
historically relied on broad standards, the IRS has created rules to implement 
these standards. The IRS has done this primarily through less formal 
guidance, such as revenue rulings and revenue procedures.46 These guidance 
items announce rules that constrain the discretion of the IRS and provide 
more certainty to the charitable sector.47 For instance, in Rev. Rul. 76-204 
the IRS ruled that an organization that acquires and preserves ecologically 
significant undeveloped land furthers a national policy of preserving natural 
resources and thereby serves a charitable purpose through advancing 
education and science.48 Rev. Rul. 75-74 provides that a public interest law 
firm that litigates cases that provides representation in cases of important 
public interest that are not economically feasible for private firms operates 
for a charitable purpose. In the public interest law firm line of business, the 
IRS additionally issued a revenue procedure that provided specific rule-based 
guidelines to operate these firms such as specific rules on the acceptance of 
fees and how much in fees they could accept.49 There are hundreds of other 
guidance items along these lines. 
The IRS develops these guidance items in large part based on its agents’ 
interactions with charitable organizations in adjudications. For instance, the 
IRS constructed its principal revenue ruling on hospitals in 1969 based upon 
its agents’ work in assessing lots of hospitals over many years.50 The agents 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 See, e.g., id. (establishing the community benefit rule for hospitals trying to qualify as charitable 
organizations); Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115 (establishing rules for organizations trying to qualify 
as charitable by providing housing). 
47 A review of the IRS Exempt Organization Continuing Professional Education Topical Index 
gives a decent idea as to the breath of the industries the IRS and the Treasury Department and the courts 
have opined upon and provided greater stability and reliance for taxpayers. http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/cpeindexbytopic.pdf. Arguably, in many instances some of the revenue rulings discussed in those 
documents may be thought to have established sets of factors rather than establishing rules per se. 
However, I leave that question for below in discussing the nature of rules and the necessary open texture 
that is left in any rule. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 34–37. 
48 Rev. Rul. 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174. 
49 Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-1 C.B. 411. 
50 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
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audit and review the applications of charitable organizations.51 Charitable 
organizations also seek private letter rulings on transactions they plan to 
enter. These daily adjudications can provide guidance both to the IRS and the 
public. While private letter rulings are only applicable to the organization 
that received the ruling, the private letter rulings are generally available to 
the public and give an understanding of the direction the IRS might choose 
under a particular circumstance. More importantly for this project, these 
regular interactions can provide the employees of the IRS deep knowledge 
of charitable organizations and the law through a case-by-case method. 
Courts fill in some of those rules as well.52 Congress provides charitable 
organizations the right to challenge any IRS decision denying the 
organization charitable status.53 A charitable organization can also challenge 
IRS decisions in court by refusing to pay a tax and then seeking a refund from 
the IRS based on the organization’s tax-exempt status.54 Utilizing this power 
of review, for instance, courts have played a role in defining the contours of 
charitable organizations and healthcare.55 Within the healthcare sphere, 
courts determined that health maintenance organizations that sold insurance 
but also provided actual care through a clinic with doctors could qualify for 
charitable status.56 In another instance, a court determined that a health plan 
by itself, without any substantial charitable activity such as operating a clinic 
or providing services for free could not qualify for charitable status.57 
Courts can sometimes interrupt the coherency that might be developed 
via IRS policy. For instance, as will be discussed more below, a court case 
rejecting an IRS ruling regarding a credit counseling organization may have 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 Hackney, supra note 20. 
52 See, e.g., Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945) (establishing that “exclusively 
operating for an exempt purpose” meant “no more than insubstantial”); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (confirming that there is a public policy limitation on the activities of charitable 
organizations under the Code). 
53 I.R.C. § 7428. 
54 I.R.C. § 7422. 
55 See, e.g., Sound Health Ass’n v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 158 (1978); Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 
985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993); IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188. 
56 Sound Health Ass’n v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 158 (1978). 
57 IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188. 
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led in part to the abuse of charitable law by credit counseling organizations.58 
The IRS had limited charitable credit counseling organizations to serving the 
poor and low income. The court found that ruling too narrow and reversed 
the IRS ruling. Nevertheless, court review obviously serves as an important 
check on the power of the IRS, and at the same time, that review serves to 
develop the rules regarding charitable organizations on a case-by-case basis. 
While Congress has mostly used standards in the Code to govern 
charitable organizations, it has used rules in some instances. In 1969, 
Congress enacted a detailed rule-based regime to govern private foundations. 
Private foundations are a subset of charitable organizations that do not 
receive broad public support.59 For instance, the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, and the Ford Foundation are private foundations because they 
received almost all of their support from one family. Private foundations are 
subject to detailed rules that focus in on a required payout regime.60 To prove 
they are charitable, they must annually make grants of a significant 
percentage of their assets to qualified charitable causes.61 They are subjected 
to stringent rules regarding self-dealing.62 Congress has also arguably chosen 
to utilize rules to implement the unrelated business income tax.63 
Congress tends to use rules for charitable tax law primarily in instances 
where it is able to focus on strict numbers or individual acts. For instance, 
Congress uses rules in part to govern private foundations where it is focusing 
primarily on numbers. Foundations must pay out a specific amount of money 
to charitable purposes annually to qualify. Congress unsurprisingly also 
adopts rules to govern the unrelated business income tax, again a matter of 
numbers. Although there are issues to still sort out, the UBIT provisions have 
a relatively high level of specificity as to what items go into income or not. 
Congress uses rules for discrete acts too. It uses rules to govern private 
                                                                                                                           
 
58 Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 78-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9660, 44 
A.F.T.R.2d 79-5122 (D.D.C. 1978). 
59 I.R.C. § 509. 
60 Id. §§ 4942, 4945. 
61 I.R.C. §§ 4942, 4945. 
62 Id. § 4941. 
63 Id. §§ 511–514. 
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foundation excise taxes such as for self-dealing. If a manager engages in a 
self-dealing transaction we simply determine the amount involved in the 
discrete act and we apply a tax. 
C. Parties Regulated/State of Enforcement 
What does the regulatory environment look like in the charitable sector? 
It generates around five percent of GDP.64 More than two trillion dollars of 
total assets held in the charitable sector are held in the health and education 
fields.65 Almost 70% of the individual organizations hold less than one 
million dollars in assets, while less than three percent of charitable 
organizations hold 80% of the assets.66 There were around 1.2 million 
registered public charities in 2012 according to IRS statistics.67 This likely 
does not come close to counting all charitable organizations. This is because 
churches and small organizations, the combination of which makes up a big 
part of the charitable sector, need not register.68 Of the total number of 
registered organizations, only 274,000 filed information returns.69 
Approximately 85,000 of those organizations filed a Form 990-EZ.70 The 
Form 990-EZ is filed by small organizations with annual gross receipts 
normally less than $200,000 and assets no more than $500,000.71 
Organizations with annual gross receipts of an amount normally less than 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 Brice S. McKeever & Sarah L. Pettijohn, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2014, URB. INST. (Oct. 
2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413277-The-Nonprofit-Sector-
in-Brief--.PDF. 
65 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-164, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: BETTER 
COMPLIANCE INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD 
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 14 (2014). 
66 Id. 
67 See McKeever & Pettijohn, supra note 64. 
68 I.R.C. § 508. 
69 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 9. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 5–6. 
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$50,000 need not file an information return, but instead must file a 990-N 
every three years.72 In 2014, over 470,000 organizations filed Form 990-Ns.73 
The vast majority of charitable organizations are small organizations. 
Charitable organizations held $2.99 trillion in assets in 2012.74 Of that 
amount though, the health and education sector held more than $2 trillion.75 
Almost 70% of the individual organizations hold less than $1 million in 
assets, while less than three percent of charitable organizations held 80% of 
the assets.76 From this information, it seems reasonable to conclude that about 
70 to 80% of charitable organizations are unsophisticated and have little 
access to legal counsel. Conversely, perhaps 20 to 30% of the charitable 
world possesses some amount of resources that may enable them to seek 
counsel. In fact, there are a few categories of the charitable sector where the 
resources are fairly significant. This would include the hospital sector, health 
maintenance organizations, universities, and the foundation world. This stark 
divergence in sophistication, size, and money likely makes drafting rules and 
regulating the charitable sector highly challenging. 
What about the IRS and its resources? After the Tea Party affair,77 it has 
been well documented that the enforcement resources are inadequate.78 
Additionally, the audit rate is quite low.79 In most years the IRS audits less 
                                                                                                                           
 
72 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL ELECTRONIC FILING REQUIREMENT FOR SMALL EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS—FORM 990-N (E-POSTCARD) (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-
Profits/Annual-Electronic-Filing-Requirement-for-Small-Exempt-Organizations-Form-990-N-(e-
Postcard); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65. 
73 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 72. 
74 McKeever & Pettijohn, supra note 64. 
75 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65. 
76 Id. 
77 Hackney, supra note 20 (evaluating the controversy over the IRS applying particularly close 
scrutiny to conservative organizations such as the Tea Party seeking to be declared as tax exempt by the 
IRS because described as social welfare organizations). 
78 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7 (describing the severe lack of resources 
under which the IRS at current operates); TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 7 (detailing the 
particularly severe resource problem of the exempt organizations division of the IRS—the division that 
oversees charitable organizations). 
79 See Charity and Nonprofit Audits (July 17, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-
Profits/Exempt-Organizations-Audit-Process (describing the IRS EO division audit process for charitable 
organizations). 
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than one percent of the existing charitable organization population.80 Fewer 
than 900 employees work in the IRS’s EO division to oversee over one 
million organizations of various sophistication and ability.81 Thus, the IRS 
looks like a typical agency that has too few resources to carry out its mandate. 
It operates two primary programs: (1) a determinations system where it 
evaluates whether to grant an organization a letter stating that the 
organization is tax exempt; and (2) an examination system where it annually 
examines nonprofits through audits and other reviews of their materials. It 
appears that the IRS is neither able to closely monitor the determination 
system, nor to stay on top of its examination system. 
D. The Recent Push to Regulate Abuses of Charity Through the Code 
With notable exceptions, Congress has generally left it to the IRS to 
write charitable tax law rules. However, in the last ten years, Congress has 
taken a more rule-based approach.82 The motivation for the legislation seems 
to be a desire to stop abuses of the charitable contribution deduction, but also 
a desire to hinder charitable organizations from taking advantage of 
vulnerable populations. This part briefly reviews three select pieces of 
legislation enacted over the past ten years. 
In 2006, as part of the PPA,83 Senator Grassley succeeded in enacting a 
number of additional somewhat eclectic, but highly complex, provisions 
directed at the charitable sector. Two of the provisions included stricter 
                                                                                                                           
 
80 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65. 
81 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT & FY 
2013 WORKPLAN, at 14 (2013). 
82 This is not to say that Congress has always left the charitable regime alone. In 1969, Congress 
imposed significant rules on the sector. That attention was mostly focused on delineating private 
foundations from public charities, and imposing strict excise taxes on the former. That was not focused 
on any particular charitable industry, but more focused on the likely independent public governance, or 
lack thereof, of organizations identified as private foundations. Congress also has alternatively generally 
eliminated insurance from qualifying as charitable and has added a more rule-based regime to govern 
excess benefit transactions. I.R.C. §§ 501(m), 4958. The more recent legislation is particularly interesting 
for its foray into governing the rules regarding qualifying as a charitable organization in a particular 
industry. 
83 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. 
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limitations on “credit counseling organizations,”84 and more defined rules 
regarding supporting organizations to ensure these organizations are 
genuinely providing benefits and services to charitable organizations.85 In 
2010, Senator Grassley was also instrumental in enacting § 501(r), which 
imposed stricter rules on the operation of nonprofit hospitals claiming 
charitable status. Grassley inserted the new nonprofit hospital legislation into 
the ACA signed by President Obama in 2010. More information regarding 
each of these organizations is provided below in Part V along with an 
evaluation of the legislation. 
Credit Counseling Legislation: In reaction to an understanding that 
many credit counseling organizations were engaged in abuse of debtors, 
Congress enacted § 501(q) to closely restrict behavior of credit counseling 
organizations. If an organization provides substantial credit counseling 
services, it is required to meet a laundry list of requirements: it must 
(1) provide services “narrowly tailored” to the specific needs and 
circumstances of consumers; (2) not make of or negotiate loans for debtors; 
(3) help creditors improve their credit only incidentally to their counseling 
regarding debt; (4) provide services without regard to the ability of a debtor 
to pay for the services; (5) implement a fee policy that is generally not based 
upon the percentage of debt a debtor owes; (6) appoint an independent 
community based board of directors; (7) not own more than a certain portion 
of a business that is engaged in lending money; (8) not pay or receive money 
for referrals; (9) not solicit contributions from consumers in an initial 
meeting to seek assistance; and (10) not receive more than 50% of its 
revenues from creditors associated with debt management plans.86 On the 
rule to standard continuum, these are certainly on the rule side of the 
continuum. 
Hospital Legislation: In 2010, Senator Grassley successfully added to 
the ACA, and Congress passed, a new Code section detailing requirements 
for a hospital to qualify as a charitable organization. The main change 
appears in § 501(r) of the Code. Hospitals on a facility-by-facility basis must 
meet four primary requirements: (1) establish a written financial assistance 
                                                                                                                           
 
84 I.R.C. § 501(q). 
85 Id. §§ 509(a)(3), 4958, 4966. 
86 I.R.C. § 501(q). 
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and emergency medical care policy; (2) conduct a community health needs 
assessment annually and implement a strategy to address those needs; 
(3) limit its charges to uninsured individuals; and (4) not engage in certain 
extraordinary collection actions.87 Congress also imposed a requirement on 
the IRS: it must audit each hospital once every three years.88 
Supporting Organization Legislation: Supporting organizations are a 
form of charitable organization that qualifies for the favored charitable tax 
status of a public charity rather than as a private foundation.89 There are three 
types of supporting organizations, conveniently labeled Type I, Type II, and 
Type III.90 When the IRS audited a number of supporting organizations in 
the early 2000s, the IRS determined that it had little concern that taxpayers 
were abusing the Type I and Type II supporting organizational structures. 
The IRS believed those structures provided sufficient oversight because of 
substantial supervision by a supported organization.91 Of the three subjects 
of new rules, the supporting organization rules are the least like the other two. 
A supporting organization is a type of charitable organization structure rather 
than a line of business. Credit counseling organizations and hospitals 
represent a distinct line of business. 
In 2006, Congress placed substantial new rules on supporting 
organizations.92 It imposed restrictive rules on Type III supporting 
organizations, and created the disfavored status of the non-functionally 
integrated Type III supporting organization.93 The legislation defined the 
relationships of each type of supporting organization, and directed the IRS 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 I.R.C. § 501(r). 
88 Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 9007(c). 
89 I.R.C. § 509(a)(3). 
90 I.R.C. § 1.509(a)-4(f), (g), (h), (j) (2012); see also Supporting Organizations—Requirements and 
Types (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/ 
Supporting-Organizations-Requirements-and-Types. 
91 See, e.g., IRS Commissioner Testimony: Charitable Giving Problems and Best Practices: 
Hearing on Charitable Giving Problems and Best Practices Before the S. Committee on Finance, 108th 
Cong. (2004) (written statement of Mark W. Everson, Comm’r of Internal Revenue), available at https:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-081.pdf. 
92 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 1241–1245, 120 Stat. 780, 1102–1108. 
93 Id. § 1241, 120 Stat. at 1103. 
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and the Secretary of the Treasury to enact regulations directing a non-
functionally integrated Type III supporting organization to pay a significant 
amount to its publically supported organization(s).94 
The legislation prohibits any supporting organization from making a 
“grant, loan, payment of compensation, or other similar payment to a 
substantial contributor (or person related to the substantial contributor).”95 
The legislation prohibits the supporting organization from loaning money to 
any person who controls the supporting organization.96 In order to alert a 
supported organization about its supporting organizations, the legislation 
requires a supporting organization to file an annual information return and to 
identify all of its supported organizations.97 In addition, the statute requires a 
Type III supporting organization to provide notice directly to its supported 
organizations.98 Congress also imposed an excise tax on non-functionally 
integrated type III supporting organizations called the tax on excess business 
holdings.99 This excise tax limits the amount of stock a private foundation, 
and now a non-functionally integrated Type III supporting organization, can 
hold when that stock is also held by the donor and translates into significant 
control over a for-profit corporation.100 Finally, the legislation included a 
number of provisions that do not appear to have any particular coherence.101 
Those include: (1) Type III supporting organizations may not support foreign 
organizations;102 and (2) Type I and Type III supporting organizations may 
                                                                                                                           
 
94 Id.; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-38-06, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE 
“PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS CONSIDERED 
BY THE SENATE ON AUG. 3, 2006 (2006). 
95 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3); Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1242, 120 Stat. 780, 
1104. 
96 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3); Pension Protection Act § 1242. 
97 I.R.C. § 6033(l). 
98 Id. § 509(f)(1)(A). 
99 Id. § 4943(f). 
100 Id. § 4943. 
101 Congress might have in these instances legislated by anecdote rather than actual reality. That 
was the case with several of the private foundation rules enacted in 1969. See Thomas Troyer, The 1969 
Private Foundation Law: Historical Perspective on Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX 
REV. 52 (2000). 
102 I.R.C. § 509(f)(1)(B). 
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not receive a gift or contribution from someone who controls their supported 
organizations.103 
E. Concluding Thoughts 
Each of these pieces of legislation is different. However, they bear 
significant similarities. Each takes a rule-oriented approach to a specific 
narrow segment of the charitable organization world. Additionally, fear of 
abuse of the charitable sector motivated Congress to act. Is this rule-based 
statutory effort by Congress for narrow segments of the charitable 
organization population wise or foolish? 
III. RULES V. STANDARDS LITERATURE 
This Part considers the literature regarding rules and standards. A 
common theme of the recent exempt organization legislation identified is that 
it is predominately rule-based rather than standard-based. Thus, this part 
considers the factors to be assessed in determining whether rules or standards 
are preferable. 
A. Rules and Standards 
“A system of rules is often thought to be the signal virtue of a system of 
law.”104 At their best, rules eliminate the tyranny of the arbitrary acts of 
unelected bureaucrats against individuals they just do not like.105 Where 
standards reign, the argument goes, a biased agent can hide behind discretion. 
With true rules, discretion is circumscribed. More important, perhaps, under 
a legislative rule-based system, the people of the democracy choose the law 
they are to be governed by, rather than allowing unelected bureaucrats to 
choose their law. Rules bring stability and certainty. They also make it easier 
                                                                                                                           
 
103 Id. § 509(f)(2). It is not at all clear why, if this requirement were appropriate, it would not also 
apply to Type II Supporting Organizations. 
104 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 968. 
105 Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1688. 
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for people to cooperate for mutual gain because they know the consequences 
of their actions before they act.106 
However, rules are costly to enact, are not well fitted to all 
circumstances, and often miss their mark of an aim at justice. Furthermore, a 
standard arguably allows us to come closer to justice in enforcing our laws.107 
A legislature that enacts a standard recognizes the limits of its ability to use 
language in a detailed manner to express how every situation should be 
governed. The standard provides flexibility to an adjudicator to achieve 
justice. 
What is a rule and what is a standard? For purposes of this article, a rule 
is a legal pronouncement that allows individuals to know ex-ante whether 
they will violate a law.108 With a standard, the lawmaker enacts a provision 
that guides people in their actions, but typically the final answer is not known 
until after adjudication. At its simplest, a rule decides a legal matter ex-ante, 
while a standard decides a matter ex-post.109 This is simplistic of course. As 
we will see below, standards often operate in rule form. Although a standard 
is ostensibly in place, many still know actions that will fall inside or outside 
the standard. Similarly, many rules leave much room for discretion after the 
fact. 
A classic example of the difference between a rule and a standard is a 
law that prohibits driving over 55 miles per hour versus a law that prohibits 
driving at an unsafe speed. The first is a rule, while the latter is a standard. 
We do not know whether we have violated the unsafe speed standard until a 
judge decides. Conversely, we know ex-ante whether we have violated a 55 
miles per hour speed limit even before the cop stops us. 
The difference between a rule and a standard is not stark. It is probably 
best to think of them along a continuum. Rules leave discretion to the 
adjudicator, and standards can apply in rule-like fashion. A policeman may 
exceed a 55 miles per hour speed limit. Someone driving a pregnant woman 
to the hospital to deliver a baby may also exceed a 55 miles per hour speed 
limit. An adjudicator would likely apply a reasonableness exception in both 
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instances even if a lawmaker did not detail such rules ex-ante. Thus, we see 
this simple rule has standard like qualities. And, as noted, standards can 
operate like rules. If a particular community understands that the standard 
prohibiting driving at an unsafe speed means that driving faster than 55 miles 
per hour is unsafe, then this standard operates like a rule. 
B. Problem of Underinclusiveness/Overinclusiveness 
It can be very difficult to develop good rules.110 The rulemaker must 
possess all of the current and future information needed. While finding good 
current information can present significant challenges, knowing or predicting 
the future is impossible. For instance, designing rules for information 
technology is particularly challenging because of its technical and rapidly 
changing nature.111 Rules in such an environment can quickly become 
anachronistic.112 
This feature of rules, the inability of the rule to consistently match the 
justification that led to the development of the rule, is referred to as a rule 
being both overinclusive and underinclusive. By overinclusive, we mean that 
the rule prohibits some activity that the rationale of the rule cannot justify. 
Thus, a requirement to drive 55 miles per hour that did not take into 
consideration the needs of police to sometimes break that rule would be 
overinclusive. By underinclusive, we mean that the rule does not prohibit 
some activity it should prohibit. For instance, a 55 miles per hour speed limit 
would not stop bad drivers who do drive 55 but are unable to drive at that 
speed in a safe manner. 
Rules tend to be transparent because they use terms that we all 
understand.113 However, rules are based on generalizations.114 A rule 
operates based on probability that a certain factual predicate will lead to a 
result that we may believe is just or not just. But, the factual predicate will 
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be wrong in some circumstances because it is based on a generalization. This 
will result in not sanctioning undesirable behavior and sanctioning some 
desirable behavior.115 For instance, someone might prohibit dogs from 
entering a restaurant because they will cause problems for patrons.116 
However, there might be some particularly well-trained dogs or seeing-eye 
dogs to which this rule should not apply. The rule would be overinclusive 
because it would be written to prohibit some instances where its justification 
does not apply. It might also be wrong in an underinclusive way by failing to 
prohibit activity that it should prohibit. Perhaps it fails to properly exclude 
unruly humans who cause similar disturbances. 
Consider a rule providing that anyone over 60 years old may not be an 
airline pilot.117 The general point of such a rule would be to stop individuals 
from piloting airplanes once they have lost the ability to operate an aircraft 
in a safe manner. This is a very simple rule to enforce, but it may end some 
pilot’s careers too soon, and not soon enough for others. There are efficiency 
losses and gains in that tradeoff. 
Sometimes a simple rule that raises problems of underinclusiveness and 
overinclusiveness, though, can be a very effective means for a regulatory 
agency that is understaffed to efficiently manage its caseload. Even though 
the rule may not be perfect, it can be easier to administer than a standard, and 
can promote certainty. Overwhelmed agencies often need simple rules to 
make decisions quickly, efficiently, and without great cost. Conforming to 
this expectation, agencies with particularly crowded dockets tend to have the 
clearest rules.118 
However, rules in this sense can also have unintended effects. If the rule 
is so disconnected from justice, it may be hard for the agency to enforce that 
rule.119 Under that circumstance, an agency may even explicitly choose to not 
                                                                                                                           
 
115 See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1695; Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis 
of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 268 (1974); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and 
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 36 (2000). 
116 See SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 32 (providing the example of the rationale behind the prohibition 
of dogs entering restaurants). 
117 Diver, supra note 5, at 69 (developing this example regarding regulating the forced retirement 
of airline pilots). 
118 Id. at 75. 
119 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 994–95. 
 
 
V o l .  1 3  2 0 1 5  |  C h a r i t a b l e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  |  1 0 7  
 
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)  
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2015.41 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 
enforce that law. An agency might conclude it does not have a sufficient 
political constituency to support that law, and avoid placing itself in a 
politically untenable spot. There is a strict rule that applies to charitable 
organizations: no inurement allowed. This is widely accepted to mean that if 
even one penny goes to an insider of a charitable organization, the charitable 
organization will lose its status. The IRS almost never enforces this rule 
because it seems unduly harsh. Congress enacted a rule that allows the IRS 
to impose a tax on less egregious forms of inurement now to try to handle 
this disconnect between the rule and IRS enforcement. Although not as 
clearly a rule, many complain today that the IRS does not sufficiently enforce 
political campaign activity limits on social welfare organizations. However, 
after the Tea Party episode, the IRS is likely afraid that it does not have the 
political constituency to safely enforce that rule. Thus, while there may be a 
rule that the IRS is supposed to enforce, it may choose not to enforce that 
rule because of the bad fit between the rule and the particular situation. 
Professor Zelenak considers this problem.120 He points out the oddity of 
the IRS’s income treatment of frequent flyer miles earned by an employee 
while working for a company. While we can question whether the concept of 
income in the Code is a rule, many experts consider frequent flyer miles to 
be income for purposes of the income tax. In other words, even though the 
concept of income might be considered a standard, the tax community has 
allowed it to operate in rule form to include within its definition these 
frequent flyer miles earned by employees. Yet the IRS does not treat frequent 
flyer miles as income from an employer for enforcement purposes.121 While 
administratively, this might make sense, it comes with serious and obvious 
rule of law problems.122 Although the IRS is directed to enforce the law in a 
particular way, where the IRS feels uncomfortable in enforcing a rule, it 
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apparently sometimes chooses not to enforce that law.123 And no one can 
challenge that choice. 
C. Optimal Social Welfare Analysis of a Rule or a Standard? 
Kaplow suggests a helpful way to think about whether to enact a rule or 
a standard. The question is whether information “should be gathered and 
processed before or after individual’s act.”124 It is more costly to implement 
a rule at the legislative stage because of the informational costs. With a 
standard, the drafter need not anticipate all problems. Nevertheless, a 
standard is more costly both to individuals trying to comply, and to 
adjudicators interpreting that standard. In general, both the complying 
individual (before the act) and the adjudicator (after the act) need to seek 
more information under a standard than under a rule. Because of the expected 
extra informational cost under a standard, an individual will be less likely to 
comply with a standard than with the less-costly rule. The adjudicator also 
will need to typically spend a greater amount of time with a standard than 
with a rule because under the standard the judge must both determine the 
relevant facts and how those facts interact with the standard. 
Based on the basic principle that information costs are different at 
different points in the rulemaking process, Kaplow builds a social welfare 
cost benefit model to analyze rules and standards. The model suggests that 
where a law will apply to many repeated acts, a rule is generally preferable.125 
However, where a law will apply to only a few acts, a standard is likely 
preferable.126 The costs and benefits include the costs of generating 
information at the different stages, and the likelihood of generating a legal 
command that will influence citizen behavior in the most optimal manner. If 
an act will repeat often, legislative rules will likely reduce total costs. 
Additionally, citizens are more likely to inform themselves about a rule than 
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they are about a standard. Where there are few acts, it is likely more costly 
to develop rules for those relatively few acts. The total costs and likelihood 
of a small group informing themselves about the law is likely not as important 
as a much larger group, unless of course there is a great amount of money at 
stake. 
For Kaplow, there is a continuum of rules and of standards that run from 
simple to complex.127 Kaplow contends that most analysts mistakenly 
compare a simple rule against a complex standard. This comparison 
inevitably, he argues, returns a judgment in favor of the complex standard. 
The simple rule is likely to be both overinclusive and underinclusive. At the 
same time, we all can envision how the complex standard will lead to the 
correct result. The simple rule typically loses to the complex standard 
because of concerns of justice. Kaplow asserts that this analysis is too 
simplistic.128 He recommends, therefore, that the analyst considering the 
rules standards question take into consideration the possibility of simple 
rules, complex rules, simple standards, and complex standards. 
A simple rule is one that has few exceptions. For instance, a simple rule 
in the case of airline pilots might be that a pilot must retire at 60 years old. A 
more complex rule might employ many exceptions to a simple rule to put 
into rule form all of the considerations we would hope a judge might consider 
to get justice right for the particular circumstance. A complex rule in the 
airline pilot context might establish a requirement that once a pilot turns 58, 
he must undergo a battery of tests assessing vision, hand-eye coordination, 
and physical and mental fitness. A pilot could maintain his work until he 
became unable to pass that battery of tests. Different weight could be given 
to each particular factor. 
A simple standard conversely might consist of only one or two factors. 
Such a standard would likely operate in a rule-like manner. In the pilot 
context, the standard might require pilots to retire when they can no longer 
safely fly a plane. In the case of that simple standard, it might be that all the 
adjudicators look at one factor: age. They might adopt a rule that at age 60 a 
pilot no longer has the ability to operate a plane at a high degree of safety. In 
this case, we would have a simple standard operating like a simple rule. 
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Finally, a complex standard admits of many factors, none of which is 
determinative. In the pilot context, this might mean that the adjudicator is 
directed to consider the pilot’s mental and physical health, dexterity, and age, 
along with the type of planes the pilot is flying and the conditions under 
which he files to determine whether the pilot can continue to fly. 
This conception of the rules versus standards debate allows a more 
sophisticated comparison. A complex rule could be superior to a simple 
standard that also manages to be both underinclusive and overinclusive. 
Conversely, although a standard is often thought to allow the adjudicator to 
come closer to justice, where a standard results in inconsistent results in 
adjudication, a deterministic rule may very well be superior to this 
randomized standard. In the complex environment that charitable 
organizations present these guides could prove helpful in analyzing the best 
course to take. 
While it seems to be Kaplow’s sense that complex rules are generally 
better than complex standards, some disagree, at least within certain contexts. 
Professor Weisbach argues that complex rules create more complexity in 
certain systems and thus can be more costly overall than a complex 
standard.129 The intuition here is that once a rulemaker has chosen complex 
rules to govern a field, the rulemaker must anticipate all the ways in which 
those rules might be abused. The need to respond to every possible abuse in 
a rule-based system leads to both greater complexity and cost. This leads 
Weisbach to the conclusion that in the case of tax law standard-based anti-
abuse rules are much more economical than detailed rules.130 
The drafters of the income tax often face the challenge of combatting 
the uncommon situation. Taxpayers regularly obtain a better tax result than 
the one Congress intended by modestly changing the form of a transaction. 
A rule-based system has to predict and handle each of those circumstances. 
If the law does not govern each of the uncommon circumstances, the 
uncommon can become common in a complex rule system. On the 
reasonable assumption that the uncommon situation will not occur often, 
adjudicators considering a complex standard only need provide the rule form 
for a much smaller subset of uncommon situations than would need the 
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legislature enacting the complex rule.131 Thus in a cost/benefit sense, the 
complex standard comes off as less costly. Given the complexity and 
uncommon nature, the complex standard likely shapes behavior as much as 
the complex rule. Also, in a realistic sense, the complex standard might be 
the only way to handle some situations because of the impossibility of 
knowing all the necessary information before the unusual circumstance takes 
place. 
As rules are enacted to manage each problematic uncommon situation 
the complex rule system becomes more complex. A more complex system 
becomes in many cases easier to abuse because it is more difficult to enforce. 
This complexity in turn hinders efficiency. Weisbach claims that in most 
instances you should still want rules in tax because of the great frequency of 
most taxable transactions.132 However, a standard is likely a less complex 
way to handle the policing of the edges of a complex rule. With a standard 
guarding the edges, adjudicators will only have to review and decide upon 
perhaps ten unusual circumstances rather than the 100 that a rule-based 
system might spend time and cost generating.133 
Weisbach believes that rules are generally the right place for most of tax 
law, but he believes that anti-abuse rules work quite well as standards. He 
notes that there are real costs associated with creating a complex system of 
rules. As rules increase, rule interactions increase at the square of the number 
of rules.134 Thus, as the rulemaker designs a rule-based system to anticipate 
every possible means of avoiding the general rule, the complexity to the 
system increases exponentially. In the case where there are many uncommon 
ways around a particular tax rule, a standard can limit the amount of rule 
interactions by keeping the uncommon rules to a minimum. 
Despite Weisbach’s cogent critique, viewing the matter of rules versus 
standards as a matter of gathering and disseminating information provides a 
useful means of assessing this age-old debate. It also opens up possibilities 
for analyzing a situation where rules could be made at different levels such 
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as the case of tax law where either Congress could pass rules or it could wait 
and allow the IRS to implement rules at the agency level. 
D. Values Approach 
Some scholars suggest there is no scientific method to determine 
whether rules or standards are ideal to a particular circumstance. There are 
simply too many factors involved. They adopt what I refer to as a values-
oriented approach that uses rules of thumb to choose between rules and 
standards. For instance, Professor Diver suggests that when trying to decide 
between a rule or a standard the rulemaker should consider three factors: 
transparency, accessibility, and congruency.135 While Diver is aiming in part 
for efficiency through these factors, he uses these factors to assess certain 
iconic legal environments where he indicates we should value one of those 
three factors more over another. Professor Sunstein also uses this values 
approach. He focuses on questions of democracy and circumstances under 
which rules or standards are more likely to be successful at achieving 
democracy. 
Diver provides a means to judge the quality of administrative 
rulemaking. Does it lack specificity or is it too rigid? He uses his three factors 
of transparency, accessibility and congruency to consider various legal 
environments. By transparency Diver means law that people can 
understand.136 By accessibility, Diver means that the law is applicable to 
concrete, real-world situations.137 Finally, congruency refers to how well the 
law matches justification to application.138 In other words, congruency is a 
measure of the extent of overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness. For Diver 
there is no one answer to the question of whether rules or standards are better. 
However, he suggests that the rulemaker should evaluate these three factors 
to make the most informed choice. By pushing a law more toward one factor, 
                                                                                                                           
 
135 Diver, supra note 5, at 67. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
 
 
V o l .  1 3  2 0 1 5  |  C h a r i t a b l e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  |  1 1 3  
 
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)  
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2015.41 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 
the rule maker will typically be pushing the rule away from the other two 
factors.139 
Diver provides rules of thumb for situations rules might be superior to 
standards or vice versa. For instance, he suggests that on the one hand, 
internal agency law is typically served better by standards.140 Congruence 
tends to be highly important in running an agency—the agency wants to 
ensure its resources are being utilized wisely.141 On the other hand, external 
rules that the agency administers are more likely to be aided by being stated 
in rule form142 where factors of transparency and accessibility are likely to 
be more important. As an example, Diver suggests that the proper allocation 
of agency resources can be a real challenge; thus, rough standards will likely 
serve the agency administrators better than explicit rules in allocating those 
scarce resources.143 However, courts typically require external rules 
regarding investigative functions to be more transparent.144 
He also compares sanctioning rules with liability rules.145 There, Diver 
finds that punishment tends to be less transparent, while criminal rules tend 
to be more precise.146 Compliance tends to be particularly important in law 
regarding liability for acts. Thus, rulemakers should strive for transparency 
in crafting laws regarding liability in order to obtain greater levels of 
compliance. The rulemaker crafting sanctioning rules, however, is trying to 
accomplish many different goals such as punishing in a manner measured to 
the crime and deterrence.147 These different goals make achieving 
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transparency quite tough.148 Congruence is likely a more important goal in 
these situations. 
Finally, Diver compares licensure schemes with prohibitory rules.149 
This final comparison is probably the most useful analogue to charitable 
organization oversight because the primary activity of the IRS is a licensing 
system. Diver argues that licensing systems are typically highly complex in 
nature and less susceptible to the use of rules.150 While direct prohibitions or 
commands can typically be stated in clear, transparent language, licensing 
systems must provide a broad sense of permission based on a large number 
of undefined complex factors; they are thus more difficult to express as 
rules.151 Based on the fact that excluding someone from a licensing scheme 
typically comes with large costs to the loser, Diver comes down in favor of 
aiming for congruency, and therefore standards, in most of these regimes.152 
However, in the situation where there is small cost lost and a large volume 
of cases, he is more inclined to give up a bit on congruence and go more for 
transparency and accessibility.153 
Professor Sunstein also employs a values oriented approach.154 To 
Sunstein, the debate pits congruence with ideal law against unfettered 
discretion to unelected judges and bureaucrats.155 Sunstein examines the 
values that rules promote: equal treatment, minimal informational costs of 
decisions, and predictability for private actors. He also considers the main 
arguments against rules such as that they are both overinclusive and 
underinclusive, they can actually mask bias, and they allow evasion by 
wrongdoers. 
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Sunstein’s primary goal is to resurrect in a sense case-by-case justice to 
show that rule of law goals can be met by some relaxation of a requirement 
for rules.156 Sunstein builds his case for modestly straying from a rule-based 
system on the premise that people in a democracy should have a right to 
particularistic judgment of their particular case.157 He argues that we have a 
tradition in our legal system of allowing legitimate rule revisions and that 
this tradition is quite democratic.158 Embracing that tradition in proper places 
can be democratic enhancing rather than harming. 
Finally, like Diver, Sunstein encourages a close look at the 
circumstances in which laws are being erected.159 Different contexts demand 
different types of legal structures. He believes that it is possible to size up 
different matters and get a sense of whether rules or standards are generally 
going to be preferable. Sunstein looks at many of the same factors that Diver 
and Kaplow and others considered. At the end he notes that there can be no 
rule that makes the determination, but it must be a question of factors that we 
consider. Those include: “the likelihood of bias, the extent of current 
information, the location and nature of social disagreement, the stakes, the 
risk of overinclusiveness, the quality of those who apply the law, the 
alignment or nonalignment of views between lawmakers and others, the 
sheer number of cases.”160 
IV. RULES OR STANDARDS FOR CHARITABLE TAX LAW? 
Requiring an organization to operate for a “charitable purpose” is 
obviously a standard. But, perhaps more importantly, this is a standard that 
is quite difficult to make into a rule. There likely is no set of optimal rules 
for determining which organizations should be granted charitable tax-exempt 
status. It is also highly unlikely that some ideal notion exists in the law 
implemented by Congress. Further, as discussed above, the nature of 
“charitable” is a concept that changes over time because it depends on the 
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moral proclivity of society today along with its needs.161 In light of these 
challenges, is it possible to develop good rules to govern charitable 
organizations in the tax realm? Even if it is difficult, might there be reasons 
of stability and certainty and efficiency to provide imperfect rules? 
Furthermore, if rules are desired, in what situation are they desired, and who 
is the best institutional player to draft those rules? 
The first part reviews a couple of recent attempts to determine whether 
rules or standards are more appropriate for one part of the tax-exempt law: 
political activity prohibitions. It next turns to the reality that it is difficult to 
write rules regarding charitable organizations because of the complexity of 
that regime. Section C applies both the Kaplow analysis and the values 
approach to examine the charitable tax-exempt organization legal 
environment. Section D considers who should develop the rules and what 
form those rules should take. 
A. Former Rules/Standards Analyses Applied to the Charitable Sector 
Two scholars recently each provided assessments of the rules and 
standards debate as it applies to a narrow rule in the charitable and social 
welfare tax-exempt organization’s context.162 Professor Aprill reviewed the 
rule that prohibits a charitable organization from intervening in a political 
campaign, and Professor Mueller reviewed the very similar rule in the social 
welfare organization context. Because this law presents many of the 
challenges that charitable organization tax law presents generally, this 
section reviews their analyses first. Do they have broader implications for the 
charitable sector? 
Aprill uses Kaplow’s optimal analysis to assess whether rules or 
standards are better to implement the prohibition on political campaign 
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intervention.163 Because there is a very low level of enforcement of this 
prohibition, standards would normally be best under the Kaplow analysis. 
However, there is a competing value involved. Where many are subject to a 
command and there is low enforcement, rules may be best. Rules can ensure 
the desired norm is understood and followed. Furthermore, where the groups 
that are subject to the command are small, unsophisticated organizations, as 
is the case with the vast majority of the charitable sector, there might be a 
real need for simple rules because these can be easier for the unsophisticated 
to seek out, understand, and follow.164 
Aprill notes that there is no agreed-upon norm regarding whether or 
what political campaign intervention should be restricted; this makes it 
difficult to draft rules.165 For instance, some believe a charity’s political 
speech should be restricted to maintain tax-exempt status; others believe the 
First Amendment protects a charitable organization’s right to engage in all 
political speech.166 Aprill argues that this lack of a norm actually augurs in 
favor of rules.167 Rules could help both legislators and organizations move 
closer to a legal norm and provide greater stability where instability currently 
lies. It is likely that some organizations engage in more political speech than 
they should and that some organizations engage in less than they could. This 
creates inefficiency, and rules could work to limit these harms Aprill 
contends.168 
Aprill recognizes Weisbach’s concern that aggressive taxpayers can and 
do abuse tax rules and that under certain circumstances adopting rules to 
manage these problems can make the tax system more costly.169 Aprill finds 
though that the anti-abuse concerns typical to tax law are not prevalent in 
                                                                                                                           
 
163 Aprill, supra note 162. 
164 Id. at 669. 
165 Id. at 671. 
166 Cf. Parks v. Comm’r, Nos. 7043-07, 7093-7, 145 T.C. No. 12 (Nov. 17, 2015) (upholding the 
political campaign limitations on charitable private foundations under the First Amendment). 
167 Aprill, supra note 162, at 671. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 679. 
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political campaign intervention; thus, standards are not to be favored here for 
anti-abuse reasons.170 
In the end, Aprill finds that the factors weigh in favor of a more robust 
rule-based regime.171 Of particular importance is that many unsophisticated 
taxpayers are trying to abide by important rules that implicate free speech. In 
this circumstance, rules can bring about more compliant behavior and likely 
lead to more equitable treatment to all taxpayers. 
Professor Mueller reviews a similar set of laws related to political 
speech prohibitions in the context of § 501(c)(4) social welfare 
organizations.172 While exempt from federal income tax, contributors may 
not deduct contributions to social welfare organizations as charitable 
contributions.173 Although presented with a related law, Mueller comes to the 
exact opposite conclusion of Aprill. She argues that given the complexity of 
the regime, only standards really make sense. Mueller also believes the great 
possibility for circumvention in this area militates for a standard based 
regime.174 In particular, she marshals evidence that uncertainty can actually 
increase compliance rather than decrease it.175 Furthermore, Mueller notes 
that low enforcement of the command and misalignment of the penalty for 
violating the campaign prohibition pushes towards a conclusion that 
standards are better here.176 Finally, looking at the challenges that the FEC 
faces in enforcement of election laws even with rules, Mueller argues that the 
political challenge of passing rules that will not generate new enforcement 
costs are too great.177 Enforcement costs will continue whether there are rules 
or not. 
                                                                                                                           
 
170 Id. at 678. 
171 Id. at 680. 
172 Mueller, supra note 162. 
173 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4); cf. id. § 170. 
174 Mueller, supra note 162, at 133. 
175 Id. at 135. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 143–55. 
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Thus, in assessing one small part of the current standard-based regime 
regarding charitable or social welfare organizations, we see conflicting 
opinion on whether rules or standards are better. Of course, that makes sense 
regarding politics, an issue that brings a significant difference of opinion. Is 
it any different when we turn to the basic rules of being a charitable 
organization? 
B. Challenges in Rulifying the Charitable Norm 
Why might the concept of a charitable organization be so hard to nail 
down in a satisfying, stable manner? First, the concept of charitable has 
multiple rationales and it changes over time because of changes in society 
and technology.178 This makes settling on the rules at the legislative stage 
difficult and costly. Secondly, the idea of charitable is applied to the concept 
of organization. Not only is there a quantifying aspect relative to acts and 
time, there is an attribution complexity.179 Finally, there is the difficulty that 
almost any type of activity, whether it be surfing or cooking or 
manufacturing, can be accomplished in a charitable manner. This final point 
means that the permutations of possible charitable organizations are likely 
infinite. 
As discussed in Part II.A, there are likely a number of congressional 
rationales for the charitable tax-exempt regime. It may: (1) provide a subsidy 
for organizations that provide an equivalent public benefit, (2) regulate 
charitable organizations, and (3) enhance pluralism. These different 
purposes, almost certainly point in different directions at times. A legislator 
or an adjudicator may find himself confused as to which purpose to place 
first or even primary. Additionally, if charitable tax law is intended to support 
the value of pluralism, it is likely that only a standard can accomplish this 
goal. Pluralism is an idea that suggests our government works best when 
                                                                                                                           
 
178 There is certainly a laymen’s conception of charity that it is aid to the poor alone. However, that 
is definitely not consistent with the conception Congress adopted or that the IRS implements or with the 
idea of charitable within the charitable trust law context. 
179 See, e.g., Presbyterian & Reformed Pub. Co. v. Comm’r, 743 F.2d 148, 155 (1984) (noting the 
great difficulty of determining intent of a party, but the even greater challenge with determining intent 
with respect to a corporation). Admittedly, the problem of attribution is faced in any legal system that 
must deal with legal entities. 
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groups promote all the different interests in our society. It suggests that we 
as a country should value diversity. As Justice Powell suggested in Bob Jones 
University, we should be hesitant to create a charitable tax law to enforce the 
status quo.180 Charitable tax law should instead promote a range of diverse 
ideas. If we want to promote new ideas, a rule-oriented regime is quite likely 
to restrict those new ideas before they even arise. 
The fact that there are at least three purposes to the law can lead to 
different directions for the rules. Some laws might be designed to identify 
organizations that should not pay tax, while others might be more focused on 
regulating charitable organizations. For instance, the recent legislation on 
credit counseling and hospitals discussed in this Article seems to be 
motivated largely by the second purpose rather than the first. In this 
legislation, Congress is interested in regulating the charitable sector rather 
than in directly determining organizations that are worthy of tax exemption 
or not. Some of these provisions might have looked different if the tax base 
were the only consideration. 
Additionally, concepts subject to great social variability are difficult to 
turn into rules. For example, the concept of obscenity is commonly 
understood to be nearly impossible to express with clarity; instead, we know 
it when we see it.181 Part of the difficulty of expression is that it changes over 
time with changes in culture and community. This means that a standard may 
be required to solve such a legal problem. The concept of “charitable” is quite 
similar. While it is a broad, expansive notion with deep history rooted in 
English law,182 it is based in community notions of what is good. The 
meaning of charitable purpose thus changes with some regularity.183 
                                                                                                                           
 
180 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 606 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). 
181 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Judge Stewart stating: “I shall not today attempt 
further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description 
[‘hard-core pornography’]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when 
I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”). 
182 See Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. ch. 4 (1601); Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1983) (discussing long history of the idea of charitable purpose). 
183 The IRS at one time did not accept that joint ventures were possible between a charitable 
organization and a for profit organization. But today, it fully accepts them. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 
C.B. 718. Donor Advised Funds were also generally prohibited, but today Congress has implemented a 
regime to fully accept them. Although in both instances the IRS was forced into these positions by courts 
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In Bob Jones University v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court explicitly 
recognized the changing nature of the charitable standard.184 Although 
discrimination on the basis of race was widely accepted by Congress in 1913 
when the Income Tax was enacted, the Court held that discrimination on the 
basis now violated a fundamental public policy.185 This example illustrates 
how society can change its mind regarding the nature of a charitable purpose. 
Many changes in charitable purpose take place as a result of changes in 
technology, law, and society. For instance, the changes in the activities and 
the character of hospitals from the start of tax-exemption in 1913 (when there 
were mostly almshouses to serve as hospitals)186 to today (when gigantic 
health systems with large insurance components roam the United States) are 
dramatic.187 Even the hospitals that qualified in 1969 look quite different than 
they do today in 2015.188 The development of Medicare and Medicaid and 
the significant changes in health care law and financing played a large role 
in those dramatic changes. In that time, the IRS has had to assess the 
charitable nature of many different models of healthcare delivery.189 
These changes are found throughout the charitable sector. As one 
Treasury Department research paper noted, “[o]ne reason that there have 
been few attempts to provide a comprehensive definition [of charity] is that 
                                                                                                                           
 
and Congress, these do still arguably reflect a change in societal views. The IRS certainly is not the definer 
of social norms, but only an interpreter in attempting to oversee charitable tax-exempt law. 
184 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
185 Id. 
186 Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a 
Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 318 (1991). 
187 See IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). 
188 Compare the proto-typical hospitals considered in Rev. Rul. 69-545 with the complex system 
reviewed in IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188. On the one hand, the standard to consider 
these cases was the same, but on the other, the financial and management complexity considered in IHC 
health systems was vastly different than the brick and mortar hospital considered in 1969. See also JAMES 
J. FISHMAN ET AL., TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 84 (4th ed. 2015) (discussing the change 
in the IRS position from a relief of poverty rationale to a community benefit standard). 
189 For example, most recently the IRS had to determine how to treat Regional Health Information 
Organizations that maintain electronic health care records for a large region: Regional Health Information 
Organization (RHIO) Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 8, 2015), http:// 
www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Regional-Health-Information-
Organization-(RHIO)-Frequently-Asked-Questions. 
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charitable activity constantly changes, and formulating a definition is 
extremely difficult when the object to be defined is in flux.”190 While some 
things stay the same, such as pure assistance to the poor, or most full-time 
schools, there are real changes in types of organizations that the IRS reviews 
today from what it reviewed in the past. Few newspapers sought charitable 
status in the past. However, today, newspapers are more and more 
considering the charitable model as a possible solution to the difficulties of 
the news market.191 Law schools might also begin using the charitable model 
to develop a new legal training model inside a training law firm.192 
Whether, our social notion of charitable changed on each of these 
matters, or it changed to accommodate technical change, does not matter. 
Also, whether society changed its mind, or the IRS implemented new 
guidance creating that change, does not matter. Because of value and 
technical change, our notion of charitable in healthcare provision is quite 
different today than it was back in the 1950s. This change makes it difficult 
to write legislative rules that cover the legislative intent on ideal charitable 
law. Rules can be written of course, but they are likely to miss many 
important differences in social value change, and technological and 
organizational change. 
The application of the charitable purpose standard to an organization is 
highly complex too. Section 501(c)(3) seems to imply that whether an 
organization qualifies depends on every act of the organization during any 
particular taxable year. The standard of “organized and operated exclusively 
for a” charitable purpose strongly suggests this; furthermore, the idea of a 
charitable purpose implies such an all-encompassing notion as well. For 
instance, in Revenue Ruling 69-545, the IRS was called on to determine 
whether Hospital A was operated for a charitable purpose. The IRS 
considered all of the contracts of the hospital, all of the acts of people who 
governed the organization, and generally considered the complete operation 
                                                                                                                           
 
190 Persons et al., supra note 40, at 1943. 
191 See Richard Schmalbeck, Financing the American Newspaper in the Twenty-First Century, 35 
VT. L. REV. 251 (2010). 
192 See Adam Chodorow & Philip T. Hackney, Post-Graduate Legal Training, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
___ (forthcoming 2016). 
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of the hospital in all of its facets from the emergency room to the operation 
of its laundry. It did this because the law demands such an analysis. 
If the law required an organization to “operate exclusively for an exempt 
purpose,” any one bad fact could take an organization out of charitable status. 
Such an interpretation could have been a time saver for the IRS. However, 
the IRS interpreted that requirement to mean that an organization qualifies if 
it “primarily engages in activities,” that accomplish such an exempt 
purpose.193 This means, in a practical sense, that the IRS must review almost 
every act of the organization during the year so that it can quantify whether 
the organization is organized and operated primarily for a charitable purpose. 
Any charitable tax rule needs to take into consideration this significantly 
factually complex environment. 
Also, challenging is the need for the IRS to attribute actions of 
employees and volunteers to the nonprofit entity. To determine the acts of a 
nonprofit entity, the IRS must evaluate who acts for the entity.194 The 
difficulty of this challenge can be seen in the IRS’s attempt to review whether 
All Saints Episcopal Church might have violated the prohibition on 
intervention in a political campaign. In that case, a visiting minister spoke 
before the church and arguably advocated for the election of John Kerry and 
against the election of George Bush in the 2004 presidential election.195 The 
question was whether a visiting minister could be considered to be acting on 
behalf of the church when he spoke before the group, such that his advocacy 
could be considered prohibited political intervention on the part of the 
church. This same matter is seen again and again in much more mundane 
situations. This extra layer makes rulemaking again subject to more 
complexity in charitable tax law. 
Admittedly, anyone reviewing the acts of an entity for legal purposes is 
presented with the same problem. However, in the realm of tax, I contend 
that this factor is exacerbated a bit more in the charitable organization context 
                                                                                                                           
 
193 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (as amended in 2014) (italics added). 
194 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-4 C.B. 1421 (in situations 3–6, the IRS examines whether 
charitable organization leaders are acting in their own capacity or as capacity of the leader of an 
organization for purposes of political activity). 
195 Rebecca Trounson, IRS Ends Church Probe but Stirs New Questions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 
2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/24/local/me-allsaints24. 
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because of the overwhelming subjective nature of the judgment regarding the 
acts that must be made. 
Ultimately, determining whether an organization is charitable is a 
different activity than determining whether a single transaction is taxable. 
This problem is the same as that identified by Diver regarding the difference 
between creating prohibitory rules and license systems.196 The latter are 
necessarily more complex and much harder to turn into rules. The point is 
that whether any organization is charitable is likely to be sui generis. This 
means that obtaining our ideal rule will be very costly because it is highly 
complex. 
A legislature could try to solve this second challenge through rules that 
require certain quantities of money or work-time to be dedicated to some 
narrowly defined activities that the legislature deems to be charitable. 
Congress has tried this solution in part with respect to private foundations.197 
These charitable organizations are required to meet a highly complex payout 
requirement that only those with sophisticated tax counsel should attempt.198 
Although the system does not define charitable acts, it does define the 
quantity of acts an organization must perform during the year to be 
considered charitable. In other words, the private foundation rules are a 
solution in part to the second problematic issue identified in this section. 
However, this regime is so complex that most organizations cannot afford 
the costs of complying with the rules. 
Now the close reader might be saying, “He can’t be arguing that tax-
exempt charitable law is so complex that it is more complex than the tax law 
itself. If that were the case, then Congress should simply erect standards 
throughout the Code. Surely, you don’t intend to make that argument?” First, 
it is perfectly legitimate and in fact advisable for Congress to enact rules in 
the Code. However, why argue that for the Code generally, but not so much 
                                                                                                                           
 
196 See supra Part III.D. 
197 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4940–4946. 
198 Id. §§ 4941–4942. Consider that Mark and Chan Zuckerberg recently eschewed the private 
foundation model even though they are planning to donate a reported $45 billion in Facebook stock. Many 
have suggested that the reason that they might avoid private foundation rules is that they are too costly, 
restrictive, and complex. Kerry Dolan, Mark Zuckerberg Explains Why the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative 
Isn’t a Charitable Foundation, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2015), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kerryadolan/2015/12/04/mark-zuckerberg-explains-why-the-chan-zuckerberg-initiative-isnt-a-
charitable-foundation/. 
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when it comes to charitable organizations? The answer to that question is that 
most Code provisions are focused on single transactions that can be looked 
at numerically and as simple discrete acts. 
For instance, basic income tax principles focus on single transactions at 
a time and the question is typically whether a particular expense is deductible 
or a particular gain is income. Even in corporate tax, which presents much in 
the way of complexity, the fundamental matter at issue is a final taxable 
amount. That taxable amount is generated based on thousands of individual 
transactions of basic income tax. Each of those transactions is valued and 
placed into a minus category, a plus category, or a nothing category. The 
charitable organization presents a similar number of economic transactions, 
but individual acts that have no value in any economic sense must be 
considered as well. And more importantly, although we might envision the 
calculus as to each act a question of charitable or not charitable, that calculus 
is a more complex social analysis that likely resembles all of the space 
between zero and one rather than simply a question of zero and one. 
Of course, there are places in the Code where a similar organizational 
complexity must be addressed. Partnership taxation comes immediately to 
mind. As in the charitable organization area, Congress tends to enact 
standards in partnership tax that the IRS must implement by enacting 
complex rules. Other matters that call for standards include issues of debt v. 
equity, economic substance, and the question of whether a transaction was 
arm’s length or not. Those matters are typically dispensed with on a case-by-
case basis rather than on the basis of rules established beforehand. This is 
likely the place where we end up for a very important reason—predicting all 
the possible ways the law might interact with complex reality is impossible 
in these realms, and standards simply must govern these worlds. 
Finally, the charitable tax-exempt regime applies to an infinite slice of 
life. We can find a way to make any sector of our economy charitable. Health 
care, insurance, education, grocery stores, the practice of law, the provision 
of housing, the provision of credit, the selling of cars, skateboarding, the 
operation of a radio, and on and on all can be considered charitable activities 
if the organization is established and operates properly. Trying to find simple 
rules, or even complex ones, to apply to such complexity is likely an 
impossible challenge. 
 
 
1 2 6  | P i t t s b u r g h  T a x  R e v i e w  |  V o l .  1 3  2 0 1 5  
 
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)  
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2015.41 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 
C. Optimal Kaplow Analysis/Values-Oriented Approach 
Using Kaplow’s analysis, we first assess how often the act to be 
governed by a rule or a standard is repeated. If an act is repeated often, a rule 
is likely preferable. Thus, to do the analysis we need to know what act we 
should focus upon. 
There is generally no one particular act for charitable organizations. The 
most common act, if it can be called that, is for an organization to operate 
primarily for a charitable purpose during a taxable year. The most common 
place where the IRS considers this question is when the IRS reviews a 
charitable organization’s application for recognition as a charitable 
organization. It considers this same question when it reviews a charitable 
organization on audit. There are some prescriptive rules, such as a complete 
ban on inurement or intervention in a political campaign, that often consist 
of a simple act. However, even these matters typically assist in the charitable 
purpose analysis. For simplicity, the analysis will focus primarily on the 
charitable purpose analysis. 
As discussed in Part II.C, there are a lot of organizations that must 
demonstrate compliance with the charitable tax-exempt regime annually. 
According to IRS statistics, here are around 1.2 million charitable 
organizations.199 The IRS data, however, is not complete. There are more 
charities than represented in data because this number does not include much 
of the church community or small organizations.200 Additionally, the IRS 
receives around 70,000 applications per year.201 In any case, the number of 
charitable organizations is relatively large. This would suggest rules might 
be preferable. 
The above numbers, however, may misrepresent the total number of 
charitable organizations where rules are needed. The charitable standard 
                                                                                                                           
 
199 See McKeever & Pettijohn, supra note 64. 
200 Under § 508(c) small organizations and churches need not file an application to be recognized 
as a charitable organization. 
201 Questions and Answers on 501(c) Organizations (May 15, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/ 
uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-501%28c%29-Organizations [hereinafter Questions and 
Answers] (noting the number of applications received); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 
81 (noting the number of applications received). 
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arguably works like a simple rule for a large percentage of the charitable 
sector. A lot of charitable organizations do perfectly charitable things, such 
as assisting the needy, educating children, or delivering meals to old 
people.202 These likely are some of the most frequent applicants for charitable 
status. If we were able to winnow out these organizations from the count of 
acts, the total number of organizations is reduced. Yet, we are still probably 
left with a significant number of organizations for which more detailed rules 
could be useful. 
Nevertheless, the question at hand regarding acts is how often the same 
act occurs. When we look at it in this way, we find that the act is not repeated 
as often as an organization count alone would suggest. As argued above, 
almost every charitable organization is charitable in its own way. We have 
booster clubs, schools, colleges, technical training, insurance companies, 
health care organizations, credit counseling organizations, pet rescue 
operations, research institutes, boy scouts, churches, many forms of poverty 
relief, housing, old age . . . the list goes on and on. And, within each of those 
contexts there is great diversity there too. The means to educate in a 
charitable manner are endless, as are the means to supply housing, religion 
and every other activity charities engage in. This factor of intense 
organizational diversity strongly supports standards. There are few places 
where rule development at a legislative level is simple because the “act” is 
so complex. Generating information before the “act” is quite difficult. It is 
better from an economic sense and an inclusive sense to develop the rule after 
the act. 
However, there are parts of charitable tax law that do repeat, and there 
are instances of discrete acts. For example, inurement and political 
intervention typically consist of relatively discrete acts. Where such discrete 
acts can be identified, the repeat of the act will be often, the rule to govern 
can be of a more simple variety, and unsophisticated parties are more likely 
to be able to comply. Professor Aprill is therefore probably right that a simple 
rule-based regime would be useful in the political speech context. There are 
specific acts that make rules easier to develop. Those rules could lead to a 
higher degree of compliance particularly among smaller, less sophisticated 
                                                                                                                           
 
202 But cf. Mayer, supra note 4, at 16 (arguing that it is not clear whether compliance is high or low 
because the IRS simply is not looking at enough organizations for us to know). 
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charities that would be able to access such simple rules with greater ease. 
Troublingly though, it may be impossible to enact rules in the political 
activities arena because of the necessarily high political costs to such 
rulemaking.203 
The analysis however does not stop at the frequency of the act. For 
Kaplow, we must take into consideration the sophistication of the parties, the 
money involved, and whether rules, even if complex, may generate more 
right answers than a standard. 
If there are unsophisticated parties, rules might generate a greater degree 
of compliance. Unsophisticated parties with little money are unlikely to seek 
guidance on the law where it appears that the cost of determining it will 
outweigh any gain they might achieve from seeking legal advice. If there are 
sophisticated parties and lots of money involved, even if there are only a 
small number, it may make sense to invest time in making good rules before 
the act. 
As developed in Part II.C there are likely many unsophisticated 
nonprofit organizations—perhaps 70 to 80% of the field. This factor would 
point in the direction of developing rules to obtain greater compliance with 
the law. However, those rules likely need to be simple to provide a benefit to 
unsophisticated parties because complex rules are likely to dissuade 
unsophisticated parties from seeking legal advice. This may be a problem for 
rules for charitable organizations. For the reasons discussed above regarding 
the diversity of charitable organizations, the rules needed are likely to be 
highly complex in this way. Additionally as rule interactions increase, the 
complexity of charitable tax law is likely to become truly formidable. Thus, 
in the case of charitable purpose, although there may be some desire for rules 
                                                                                                                           
 
203 The IRS arguably tried to do just this in promulgating new rules to apply to the political activities 
of social welfare organizations. See I.R.S. News Release, IR-2013-92 (Nov. 26, 2013). The notice was 
posted on the Federal Register on November 29, 2013 as a Notice of Public Rulemaking (NPRM). 
Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 
Fed. Reg. 71,535 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). In that NPRM the IRS 
proposed a rule-based regime. For instance, it explicitly defined voter guides as candidate-related political 
activity in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.504-1(a)(2)(iii)(7). Id. Previously, whether a voter guide was not an 
exempt activity was determined on a standard that considered all the facts and circumstances. See, e.g., 
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. Although some provided support for the NPRM, the loudest voices 
strongly criticized the new rules. See, e.g., Deirdre Shesgreen, IRS Proposal on Non-profit Political 
Activity Criticized, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/02/ 
26/irs-non-profit-rules/5846445/. 
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to increase compliance among unsophisticated parties, we may not be able 
accomplish that goal. 
There are also sophisticated wealthy organizations such as hospitals, 
universities, and foundations. It is possible that spending some significant 
up-front time to generate good rules for these organizations could be useful. 
These rules would likely need to be complex if we want to avoid significant 
under and over inclusion. Thus, developing them is very costly, and may be 
impossible because of the change that takes place in these sectors. Also, 
highly complex rules in this area might harm the large unsophisticated sector 
because these rules are likely to interact with the rules that impact the 
unsophisticated parties. That additional complexity again is likely to deter 
unsophisticated party compliance. 
Finally, in the enforcement context, rules can help enforcers manage 
where there are many acts to be reviewed and agency resources are low. IRS 
resources are inadequate to oversee the charitable organization sector. This 
factor weighs in favor of developing rules to help the IRS manage its 
workload. Consistent enforcement of the law with rules may be better than 
sporadic inconsistent enforcement of a standard. Of all the factors, this one 
weighs the most strongly in favor of rules. 
This analysis leaves us with conflicting guidance. Much of the factors 
suggest that at the level of charitable purpose we would be best served to 
leave the legal command at the level of standards. The complexity and 
changing nature of charitable purpose make rules likely to be harmfully 
underinclusive and overinclusive. Using rules will fail to incentivize 
organizations we want to incentivize. And, using rules will fail to deter an 
unacceptable amount of abusive organizations. Nevertheless, lack of 
enforcement resources push strongly towards using rules. 
What might the values approach recommend? Diver recommends 
looking at three factors: transparency, congruency, and accessibility. The 
question is which factor is most important to the goals and the environment 
in which the law is being applied. Is transparency, congruency, or 
accessibility the most important factor in charitable organization oversight? 
While external agency rules should likely be more transparent, and 
accessible, there is a difference between sanctioning rules and licensing rules. 
Diver recognizes that licensing regimes tend to need congruency because of 
the wide range of factors and time that are involved. However, he also 
recognizes the fact that transparency through rules can help an overwhelmed 
agency work through its caseload. In the end, Diver’s analysis sends us to 
 
 
1 3 0  | P i t t s b u r g h  T a x  R e v i e w  |  V o l .  1 3  2 0 1 5  
 
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)  
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2015.41 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 
probably about the same place. For charitable purpose, standards might be 
ideal. However, enforcement ability strongly pushes in favor of some level 
of rules—probably simple ones. To the extent charitable tax law is penalizing 
discrete acts, such as political campaign intervention, there are stronger 
reasons for the use of transparent rules. Additionally, where it veers into 
policing fundamental rights, transparent rules may be important and maybe 
even necessary.204 
What about the Sunstein approach? While Sunstein also considers many 
of the same factors as Kaplow and Diver, Sunstein gives some extra thought 
to the likelihood of bias, the location and nature of social disagreement, the 
stakes, the quality of those who apply the law, and the alignment or 
nonalignment of views between lawmakers and others. These factors double 
in a sense as questions about whether rules are desired and whether there are 
reasons for the legislature or the agency to develop the rules. 
If Congress thinks the IRS is likely to enforce charitable tax law with 
bias, Congress might want rules over standards. While the recent Tea Party 
affair might suggest Congress should be concerned about IRS bias, the run 
of the mill charitable purpose issue is probably not that subject to bias. The 
IRS itself is fairly insulated from the political process—it only has two 
political appointees. Also, the vast majority of charitable determinations 
connect little to politics or religion—the two places Congress is likely to be 
most concerned about bias. Thus, on the issue of charitable purpose, 
Congress should expect a relatively unbiased application by the IRS. This 
would tend toward standards for charitable purpose, but maybe rules for 
religion and political activities. Of course, again for political reasons, it is 
also likely very difficult for Congress itself to agree on rules on these matters. 
Other Sunstein factors to consider include: the location and nature of the 
social disagreement, the stakes, the quality of those who apply the law, and 
the alignment or nonalignment of views between lawmakers and others. The 
first issue largely boils down to whether the Congress trusts the IRS or judges 
to apply a charitable standard. The stakes involved are often limited because 
for many organizations tax exemption does not provide large benefits. An 
organization that makes no profit experiences no gain from being relieved of 
paying an income tax. However, the stakes can become quite large when the 
                                                                                                                           
 
204 See Hackney, supra note 20, at 454 (arguing that when the Service is investigating a matter 
involving fundamental Constitutional rights it should exercise greater care). 
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charitable contribution deduction and the other potential benefits that can 
flow from charitable status are considered. Thus, the stakes involved may 
point towards some consideration of rules. 
The quality of the individuals applying the law is an important factor in 
charitable organization law. During the Tea Party affair it became evident 
that there are not enough workers and that the workforce lacks some 
sophistication.205 This factor points towards simple rules in the same way we 
determined that an overworked agency may need simple rules to manage its 
workload. Of course, Congress has recently enacted a number of laws 
constricting the scope of the IRS in applying the laws regarding certain 
charitable organizations. This is objective evidence that Congress does not 
trust the IRS in applying the standard correctly without the aid of specific 
rules. 
The Sunstein considerations may tell us something about the desirability 
of rules, but they are also quite conclusory. If Congress does not trust the 
enforcer, they may choose to impose rules, even if they are not ideal for a 
particular situation. Thus, this final set of values to consider seems a little 
less useful. Nevertheless, this final assessment does suggest that there is 
some need for rules in this environment. It also leads into the next two 
questions of who should develop those rules and what form should they take. 
D. Who Should Develop Charitable Rules and What Form Should They 
Take 
The IRS should generally develop the rules regarding charitable 
purpose.206 This inclination is driven by the fact that the analysis above only 
came to the conclusion that rules are likely useful in this arena because of an 
imperfect enforcement environment and lack of sophisticated parties. All 
things considered, we might prefer standards for charitable purpose. 
                                                                                                                           
 
205 Nicholas Confessore, David Kocieniewski & Michael Luo, Confusion and Staff Troubles Rife 
at IRS Office in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2013 (describing the main IRS office evaluating applications 
as an “understaffed Cincinnati outpost that was alienated from the broader I.R.S. culture and given little 
direction”). 
206 However, this is only the beginning of an analysis because the issue involves the question of 
congressional delegation, which is beyond the scope of this article. 
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However, since we need rules, how can we best minimize the likely harm 
from overinclusion and underinclusion? 
Congressionally set charitable purpose rules are likely to be problematic 
for the long-term health of charitable organization law for a number of 
reasons. Rules set by Congress are highly likely to be reactionary and aimed 
at solving some charitable abuse problem.207 Congress is unlikely to be able 
to generate the best information in that environment or to enact the type of 
rules that will not cause harmful overinclusion and underinclusion. Finally, 
and most importantly, the permanence of rules set at that level would increase 
the harm of that overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. Congressional 
rules are likely aimed at the uncommon situation that Weisbach identified 
that occurs in tax law at times. In these instances it is likely that rather than 
bringing clarity, Congress creates much more complexity than would have 
been needed had it left the imperfect law alone. 
The IRS, however, can write rules that provide certainty while 
maintaining the flexibility necessary for the changing nature of the concept 
of a charitable purpose. The IRS reviews real cases as they arise. This 
provides it an informational advantage over Congress that can only access 
this information through investigations. The IRS can enact useful guidance 
based on that information that responds to real organizational problems. 
Additionally, as the facts change over time, the IRS has the flexibility to 
change those rules or modify them more significantly than if Congress has 
established strict rules. 
As to the final question, the IRS should enact these rules in flexible 
forms of guidance. Regulations are hard to implement, and are hard to 
change. Regulations are likely therefore to suffer from the same problems as 
legislation. The IRS and Treasury should, however, consider using 
regulations with rules to govern matters of discrete acts such as political 
campaign intervention and excess benefit transactions. They should leave 
matters of charitable purpose though at the level of standard in the regulation. 
Rules regarding charitable purpose can be effectively developed in revenue 
rulings and revenue procedures where there is a greater level of flexibility. 
These thoughts and conclusions in this section are limited to an ideal 
efficiency analysis. An analysis of this matter through the principles of 
                                                                                                                           
 
207 See Troyer, supra note 101 (discussing the tendency of Congress to legislate by anecdote in the 
charitable realm, leading to harmful law). 
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delegation, rather than through just a rules and standards analysis, could 
change these conclusions regarding form. To complete a full analysis of the 
legal form we would need to know the level of deference courts should 
provide to these products. Courts appear to be quite confused as to what 
deference if any that they should give to these forms of guidance.208 If these 
forms of guidance are provided limited or no deference, we might think 
differently about whether flexible forms of guidance are ideal. Thus, more 
work needs be done. 
With all of this said, Congress is likely the best rulemaker in a few 
instances. First, where there is a need to prescribe certain conduct such as 
inurement or engaging in political activities as discussed in Part IV.C, it 
makes perfect sense for Congress to set these rules. We have no strong reason 
to believe that ideas regarding inurement or political activities are likely to 
substantially change or to be highly complex in the way that charitable 
purpose is likely to be highly complex. This is also likely to apply in 
situations such as UBIT and excess benefit transactions. The activity being 
prescribed in both are relatively straightforward taxable transactions. 
Congressionally set rules, therefore can provide certainty in these areas 
where there is likely little change over time. This can be helpful to the IRS 
because of the fact that penalties and high dollar amounts are often owed in 
these circumstances. 
Second, there may be a place for Congress to enact procedural rules that 
make organizations engage in charitable behavior and makes it easy for the 
IRS to verify. It is doubtful that the IRS has the authority to impose such 
procedures or, even if it does, that it would use that authority, without the 
express statutory authority of Congress. These come though with no 
insurance that charitable conduct will be better, and they increase the costs 
of complying with the charitable regime. Congressional establishment of 
these types of rules though does not conflict with the need for flexibility in 
defining charitable purpose, because it does not define charitable purpose; it 
only sets a procedure for determining whether the organization is operating 
for that charitable purpose. 
Finally, given the resource challenges faced by the IRS in its exempt 
organization division, Congress should consider rules that limit the 
                                                                                                                           
 
208 Hickman, supra note 17, at 469–70. 
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organizations that qualify for charitable status. If Congress finds a category 
of organization that is of highly questionable qualification as a charitable 
organization, it probably makes good sense to enact a simple rule to remove 
the organization from charitable status. Congress did this for insurance 
companies by enacting § 501(m). That probably simplified the IRS oversight 
role significantly. As discussed below, such a choice might make sense for 
hospitals too. 
V. ANALYSIS OF RECENT LEGISLATION 
In light of the above analysis, what can we say about the effectiveness 
of the recent credit counseling, hospital, and supporting organization 
legislation? Congress tended towards the rule side of the rule/standard 
continuum in these efforts. Obviously, the claim here is that congressional 
rules can be expected to be harmful to charitable oversight. Does that analysis 
hold up here? 
The credit counseling legislation is likely to be harmful to compliance 
and oversight, because it largely focused on matters of charitable purpose. 
These rules are likely to cause harmful overinclusion and underinclusion. 
The supporting organization legislation and hospital legislation will likely 
come with problems, but may be saved in part by using procedural rules that 
clearly apply to distinct segments of sophisticated charitable organizations. 
However, all of these rules added complexity without likely improving 
organizational behavior. It is unclear that any benefits outweigh the costs of 
the complexity and the underinclusion and overinclusion involved. 
A. Credit Counseling Legislation 
1. Credit Counseling Legislation 
The IRS began to publicly evaluate the credit counseling industry and 
its use of charitable tax-exempt status in the early 2000s.209 A credit 
counseling organization operates to educate the public on debt management 
and also to assist debtors in negotiating with creditors to establish a plan to 
get out of debt. At that time, the Federal Trade Commission and state 
                                                                                                                           
 
209 I.R.S. News Release, IR-2003-120 (Oct. 14, 2003); I.R.S. News Release, IR-2006-80 (May 15, 
2006). 
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regulators were worried that these organizations were taking advantage of 
consumers.210 Often, rather than helping individuals get out of debt, some of 
these organizations made a debtor’s situation worse. The IRS had recognized 
the vast majority of this industry as charitable, and therefore, exempt from 
income tax. There were only 200 credit counseling organizations in 1990. 
However, by the early 2000s that number had expanded to over 1,000.211 This 
increase might have been the result of legislation passed by Congress in 1996 
that restricted credit repair organizations from acts perceived as abuses of 
debtors, but exempted from the law credit repair organizations that qualified 
as charitable organizations under the Code.212 
The IRS ruled in 1965 that an organization that assisted individuals with 
bad debt could qualify as a tax-exempt social welfare organization under 
§ 501(c)(4), but not as a charitable organization.213 While social welfare 
organizations are exempt from tax, donors can only deduct their 
contributions to a charitable organization.214 In 1969, the IRS ruled that an 
organization that educates consumers about credit and helps low-income 
individuals manage bad credit could qualify as a charitable organization.215 
This rule changed though after the IRS lost a case against an Alabama 
organization that helped both low-income and middle-class individuals for a 
fee.216 The court held that the organization was educational. It further held 
that the specific debt management assistance was an integral part of the 
educational activity of the organization. Finally, because the IRS argued that 
                                                                                                                           
 
210 I.R.S. News Release, IR-2003-120 (Oct. 14, 2003); I.R.S. News Release, IR-2006-80 (May 15, 
2006). 
211 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 94. 
212 Debra Cowen & Debra Kawecki, Credit Counseling Organizations, in EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TEXT (2004) (seeming to attribute the increase 
in credit counseling “agencies” and “repair organizations” to the passing of the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2451, 110 Stat. 3009–455 (1996)). 
213 Rev. Rul. 65-299, 1965-2 C.B. 165. 
214 I.R.C. § 170. 
215 Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115; see I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 2004-31-023 (July 30, 2004) 
(discussing the IRS guidance history regarding credit counseling organizations). 
216 Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 78-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9660, 44 
A.F.T.R.2d 79-5122 (D.D.C. 1978); see Cowen & Kawecki, supra note 212. 
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the credit counseling organization could not charge a fee for these services, 
the court held that a charitable organization is not required to provide services 
to low income individuals for free.217 
The IRS, the Federal Trade Commission, and state regulators announced 
in 2003 that they were all taking a closer look at credit counseling 
organizations, and warned consumers about engaging in business with these 
organizations.218 The IRS also issued a series of legal opinions219 and 
examined a significant segment of the credit counseling industry holding tax-
exempt status.220 The IRS revoked the tax-exempt statuses of a large segment 
of the credit counseling industry because these organizations were not 
properly conducting activities for the public benefit.221 The primary attacks 
of the IRS in this round were to claim that the organizations did not conduct 
education and that they were operated for the private benefit of organization 
operators. 
In 2006, concerned about the same abuses perceived by the IRS and the 
FTC, Congress enacted § 501(q) to apply specific requirements to “credit 
counseling organizations” that qualify as charitable or social welfare 
organizations under the Code.222 In the new law, described above in Part II.C, 
Congress placed far more restrictions on charitable credit counseling 
organizations than it had placed on any other charitable industry sector. The 
primary goal of the law was to protect consumers who seek help in repairing 
credit. Among other matters, it prohibited or limited activities that were 
subject to particular abuse such as loans to debtors, fees charged for debt 
management plans, and fees for a referral to another organization. Taking 
note of the fact that the IRS had been successful in attacking some of these 
abuses, the Joint Committee on Taxation Explanation suggests that the new 
                                                                                                                           
 
217 Id. at 85,191, 44 A.F.T.R.2d at 59-5124. 
218 I.R.S. News Release, IR-2003-120 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
219 I.R.S. Legal Mem. 2004-31-023 (July 30, 2004); I.R.S. Legal Mem. 2006-20-001 (May 19, 
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220 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CREDIT COUNSELING COMPLIANCE PROJECT (2006), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/cc_report.pdf. 
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222 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. 
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legislation is entirely consistent with prior IRS action and guidance, and only 
enhanced the IRS efforts.223 
Congress defined credit counseling organization functionally. The rules 
apply to an organization that provides “substantial” “credit counseling 
services” that is trying to qualify and maintain status as a charitable or social 
welfare organization.224 Congress defined credit counseling services broadly 
to include “the providing of educational information to the general public on 
budgeting, personal finance, financial literacy, saving and spending 
practices, and the sound use of consumer credit,” or “the assisting of 
individuals and families with financial problems by providing them with 
counseling.”225 
The IRS has issued neither regulations nor revenue rulings on this set of 
rules for credit counseling organizations. However, it has engaged in 
litigation.226 It also issued a Program Manager Technical Advice 
memorandum on whether an organization providing advice to homeowners 
on debt needed to abide by the new rules.227 It found that the definition of 
credit counseling applied broadly. Instead of the rules applying only to 
traditional credit counseling organizations, the rules applied to organizations 
assisting homeowners in potential foreclosure situations. 
The credit counseling legislation fails on a number of levels. First, 
Congress enacted rules regarding charitable purpose, which according to the 
above analysis should be problematic. Second, it passed complex rules for a 
very small number of organizations. Third, Congress wrote the legislation 
broadly such that it likely impacts many groups that Congress did not intend 
to impact. Finally, Congress implemented rules that should be applicable to 
the industry as a whole, not just those that qualify as tax-exempt. This final 
one is admittedly not exactly about rules versus standards. 
                                                                                                                           
 
223 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 94. 
224 I.R.C. § 501(q). 
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Fundamentally, the problem with this legislation is that it imposed rules 
on a matter of charitable purpose. Congress tried to define the acts that make 
a particular industry organization charitable or not. Given the analysis above, 
we should expect this effort to be one of folly, and one that will result in 
harmful overinclusion and underinclusion. It should lead to inefficiencies in 
the provision of charitable services. The law will discourage efforts that 
might have fit the charitable ideal while likely allowing efforts that do not fit 
the charitable ideal. A number of other matters compound this problem 
though. 
At the time of the legislation about 1,000 organizations qualified as 
credit counseling organizations. In a relative sense, this is a very small 
number of total charitable organizations. Using the Kaplow analysis, this was 
likely an inefficient place for Congress to make rules. Because there were a 
small number of organizations, it was probably better in a cost sense to rely 
more on case-by-case means of analysis. As discussed above, the IRS is 
probably the better party to make the rules on charitable purpose for credit 
counseling organizations. 
But this inefficiency is likely not the only problem with legislating for a 
small group. In effect, Congress sought to shut down uncommon situations. 
This effort is likely to lead to the problems identified by Weisbach in making 
the uncommon common. While Congress might succeed in stopping the 
abuses that it was able to anecdotally observe, it likely opened doors for 
abuses we are yet to see. 
As discussed above, the IRS was already taking on this industry and 
having some success. It would have been far better to allow the IRS to reign 
in the industry as best as possible. The overall increase of complexity to the 
charitable sector with the addition of these complex rules for a small group 
of organizations was not worth it. 
As identified above, a problem with developing rules for sophisticated 
organizations is that those rules, if not cabined properly, might end up 
causing harm to the unsophisticated part of the sector. Credit counseling 
organizations largely seem to be sophisticated organizations with substantial 
amounts of money. Thus, rules might have made sense if Congress could 
successfully limit the complexity to that sector alone. The definition of 
“credit counseling organization,” however, is so broad that many 
organizations outside credit counseling organizations will need to determine 
whether the rules apply to them. This is costly and may have the bad effect 
that organizations choose not to seek guidance because of the costs involved. 
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A further potential problem of the broad definition is that it may result 
in the IRS choosing not to apply the law in all applicable circumstances. This 
might happen if the law technically applies to an organization that helps 
students with student loans, but its application would cause harm to that 
organization’s operation. It may not be in the IRS’s political interest to apply 
this legislation broadly to activities beyond the traditional credit counseling 
organizations. Although these choices are likely to be based in practical 
reality of enforcement, this creates real rule of law problems. 
Additionally, this legislation is truly focused on consumer protection 
rather than charitable purpose. The IRS is probably not the best agency to 
handle these matters. Perhaps the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) would 
be the better agency. Providing consumer protection jurisdiction to the IRS 
could result in the laws being less effective than if placed in a more logical 
location such as the FTC. The legislation directs the IRS’s attention away 
from charitable tax law. Following the rule of thumb of this article that 
Congress should stick to standards in charitable tax law would have stopped 
Congress from moving to impose rules in an area where they are not the most 
efficient creators of such rules. 
Finally, many of the ideas Congress adopted to apply to credit 
counseling organizations might be broad principles that could be adopted and 
applied to charitable organizations generally. Applying those principles 
narrowly leaves a confusing muddle of the law because it calls into question 
whether those principles have any application in other areas now. For 
example, the requirement of a community board is something that the IRS 
often considers as a factor in determining whether an organization is 
charitable. Applying it in such a narrow context limits its economy as a rule 
and may even lead to conclusions that it is not even a factor in assessing other 
charitable organizations. This would be an unfortunate consequence of the 
rule. 
The point here is not that there should be no credit counseling 
organization rules. Instead, Congress probably failed in its drafting of rules 
for credit counseling organizations because it is a bad institution to generate 
the rules necessary to govern such organizations. There is so much 
complexity involved in credit counseling activities that rules generated at the 
IRS based on case-by-case knowledge are likely to achieve greater 
congruency than those by Congress. What should Congress do instead? Not 
pass legislation. For matters of charitable purpose, Congress should stick to 
broad standards and allow the IRS to organically develop any needed rules. 
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There are ways that Congress can make its interests known to the IRS. It can 
hold hearings, conduct research, and communicate concern to the IRS, all 
without passing legislation. 
B. Hospitals 
The IRS has long held that nonprofit hospitals generally qualify as tax-
exempt charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3).228 Although originally 
this status was based upon a hospital providing a substantial amount of 
charity care,229 the IRS changed that standard in 1969 to a community benefit 
standard.230 In that ruling, the IRS ruled that a hospital that, inter alia: (1) was 
open to all in the community who could pay; (2) operated an emergency room 
that treated all patients without regard to ability to pay; (3) maintained a 
board representative of the community; and (4) generally dealt fairly with its 
doctors could qualify for charitable status.231 While there were other ways to 
qualify, this came to be known generally as the community benefit standard. 
Many criticize the community benefit standard because it allows almost 
any hospital to qualify as a charitable organization.232 The primary critique 
is that there is no difference between most nonprofit and for-profit hospitals 
to justify treating one as exempt from taxation and not the other. Because 
nonprofit hospitals provide very similar services and also treat patients in 
very similar ways, there is no reason to provide a subsidy to these 
organizations goes the argument. Professor Hansmann, for instance, argues 
that for profit hospitals would likely be more efficient in an economic sense 
than their nonprofit counterparts.233 Some have made the case though that 
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26 (1976). 
233 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 75 (contending that nonprofit hospitals are likely over capitalized 
as compared to their for-profit counterparts). 
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nonprofit hospitals do provide some good by providing services that would 
otherwise not be provided as sufficiently by for-profit hospitals.234 
In the same way that Senator Grassley spurred the IRS into action on 
both supporting organizations and credit counseling organizations, Grassley 
nudged the IRS to look closer at hospitals, too. In 2009, the IRS released a 
report on hospitals.235 The IRS sent out a questionnaire to more than 500 
nonprofit hospitals to find out about the sector’s operations. The IRS was 
able to draw limited conclusions from the information it generated. It 
conducted audits of a number of hospitals that were outliers in executive 
compensation.236 This significant review of the hospital sector did not result 
in any substantive changes in the IRS position on hospitals. However, the 
IRS implemented a new schedule for hospitals on the Form 990 called 
Schedule H.237 On that form, the IRS requires hospitals to describe the charity 
care they provide, the joint ventures they have entered, and the deals they 
have engaged with insiders. 
The IRS has spent substantial time implementing regulations regarding 
these new rules for hospitals.238 The fact that the IRS has spent time 
promulgating regulations suggests that this new law might be a little less on 
the rule end of the spectrum than the credit counseling law. A direct 
command to establish a written financial assistance policy falls on the rule 
side, and while a requirement to conduct a community health needs 
assessment is much more rule oriented than operating for a charitable 
purpose, it left a lot to be defined. 
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Hospitals are the largest sector of charitable organizations by asset 
size.239 Thus, good rules, even if complex arguably would be useful to govern 
this sector. The analysis above would suggest, though, that it would be better 
if the IRS, rather than Congress, drafted these rules. How does the new 
hospital legislation fare under the analysis? 
The hospital legislation was less complex than the credit counseling 
legislation and utilized more procedural-like rules as opposed to behavioral 
rules. For instance, the CHNA is a mandated process that the hospital must 
perform rather than an activity it must do to be charitable in and of itself.240 
The focus on procedure rather than organizational behavior likely allowed 
relatively transparent and accessible rules. In considering the need for rules 
from an administrative standpoint, process-oriented rules are likely 
particularly useful. There is little subjectivity in these rules. Organizations 
can follow the rules, and the IRS can relatively easily administer them. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear that these new rules will change behavior in 
a positive manner. Obviously reviewing charitable needs of the community 
and reporting on them does not ensure that the hospital operates more 
charitably. Additionally, these rules add extra work and complexity to 
charitable law for hospitals. Hospitals already have an obligation imposed by 
the IRS to provide fairly significant public disclosure regarding their 
activities through the Form 990 and Schedule H. In spite of all of this 
disclosure there is still frustration with the hospital sector. It is hard to believe 
that the answer really lies in more disclosure. 
Thus, Congress increased the costs of both regulating and complying 
without clear substantive benefits in return. Rather than encouraging 
hospitals to become better actors, these provisions may have the perverse 
result of decreasing compliance. Some may choose not to seek counsel 
because they are spending time doing busy work complying with Code 
provisions. The new rules will also increase rule interactions making 
compliance more costly. 
These rules will also increase the regulatory costs of the IRS. None of 
these new provisions is a substitute for the old law. There is nothing about 
the process or the requirements that organizations had to do before these 
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provisions, and it is unlikely that they will serve as substitutes for the 
community benefit test. Perhaps the CHNA helps provide a tool for the IRS 
to ensure that the community benefit standard is being met, but it is still an 
extra step. Further compounding the extra costs on the IRS is that Congress 
now requires the IRS to audit a hospital once every three years. This is a rule 
about agency resources. Diver in particular has suggested that standards are 
better in terms of the allocation of scarce agency resources. A regulatory cost 
here may be that the IRS may be forced to allocate too many resources to 
hospitals, and away from other important sectors. 
Congress should consider applying the broad principles it is seeking to 
inculcate through this legislation outside of the tax regime or more broadly 
within charitable tax law. First, Congress should consider enacting the credit 
policies on all hospitals, not just the charitable ones. Realistically, those are 
more about consumer protection than about charitable purpose. Using 
charitable tax law unnecessarily complicates that law and fails to apply the 
principle to all organizations to which the law should apply. Second, there 
might be rules that should be applied more broadly to charitable 
organizations. This would be a more economical use of rules. If it is the 
conclusion that hospitals objectively will behave more charitably if forced to 
annually file a community benefit report, perhaps this should be applied to 
all charitable organizations. 
Finally, Congress could have considered eliminating hospitals 
altogether as Congress did with insurance companies.241 This could simplify 
the challenge of managing charitable organizations and it may also improve 
charitable oversight by eliminating a part of charitable law that leads to 
incongruity with ideal charitable law. There are many who have called for 
hospitals to lose charitable status for lack of fit with the charitable ideal. A 
taxing regime applied to hospitals, although complex, would arguably be a 
simpler regime to enforce. Of course, there would be hospitals that would 
continue to apply, but they would not need the promotion of health to do so. 
Hospitals that are operated to provide substantial care for free to the poor 
would continue to qualify, as likely would those that engage in substantial 
research or teaching. 
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What should Congress do instead? Not act. Hospital behavior is likely 
to be about the same as before, but simply subject to greater costs. Thus, it 
would be better to have left the state of the law as it is—as a standard. 
Alternatively, eliminating hospitals from tax exemption could have enhanced 
the oversight of charitable organizations by removing a huge destabilizing 
sector from the regime. Hospitals would then be taxable, which comes with 
complexity, but a complexity that the IRS is much more prepared to handle. 
Finally, consider ways to apply the procedural principles more broadly 
whether within charitable tax law or in law more appropriate to the matter at 
hand. 
C. Supporting Organizations 
In 1969, Congress significantly changed charitable organization law.242 
Congress passed strict rules to apply to private foundations, which were 
defined in a negative manner as any charitable organization that did not 
qualify as a public charity.243 Public charities include recognized community 
organizations such as hospitals, churches, or schools,244 and also 
organizations that receive broad public support.245 All other charitable 
organizations are classified as private foundations. A private foundation 
tends to receive the vast majority of its support from one family or a small 
group of families. Congress imposes highly restrictive rules on private 
foundations.246 Additionally, a private foundation is not able to offer as 
valuable of a charitable contribution deduction to its donors as it could if it 
were a public charity.247 
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Congress though provided a means to avoid private foundation status: 
form an organization to “support” a public charity.248 Under section 
509(a)(3), the family foundation seeking supporting organization status must 
meet several tests. The key test is the relationship test. Under that test the 
organization must be operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection 
with one or more public charities.249 
The IRS enacted some of its most complex regulations250 to stem abuses 
of the supporting organization structure. A supporting organization looks 
much like a private foundation. Like private foundations, the biggest concern 
is that a wealthy individual might put significant funds into the supporting 
organization, take a large deduction, and yet pay little in actual money to 
charity. In other words, the structure potentially allows a charitable deduction 
without a real charitable contribution. 
In the late 1990s, the media placed a spotlight on the abuse of supporting 
organizations. One national article pointed to cases such as that of Gerry 
Spence, who contributed a ranch to a supported organization and continued 
to use the place for his own purposes.251 
Type I supporting organizations must establish a legal relationship with 
a supported organization similar to a parent-subsidiary relationship.252 In 
other words, in the Type I structure, a public charity appoints the board of 
the supporting organization. In that way, a public charity controls the actions 
of the supporting organization, and Congress can generally expect the 
organization to behave in the interest of the public charity rather than the 
wealthy donor. A Type II supporting organization is said to establish a 
brother-sister-like corporate relationship with its supported 
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organization(s).253 This means the same people that control the supported 
organization control the supporting organization. That leaves Type III 
supporting organizations. In a Type III structure, there is no direct control by 
a supported organization or supported organizations.254 The supported 
organization instead typically has what is referred to as a significant voice in 
the decisions of the supporting organization.255 
In its report, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector singled out the Type III 
structure as particularly subject to abuse. The Panel recommended imposing 
a payout requirement on Type III supporting organizations to ensure the 
supporting organization distributed a significant amount of money to its 
supported organization.256 The report stated: “a donor may inappropriately 
maintain de facto control over a Type III supporting organization and then 
cause it improperly to provide private benefits.”257 
The new rules described above in Part II.C show that Congress tried to 
stop the abuse of the Type III structure in particular. The IRS has spent 
significant time providing guidance regarding these new supporting 
organization rules. It issued a notice about the new requirements, an 
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, a notice of proposed rulemaking, 
and a final regulation along with another notice of proposed rulemaking.258 
The supporting organization legislation is not about charitable purpose. 
It instead focuses on organizational structure and behavior. Thus, Congress 
here avoided the trap of legislating on charitable purpose. Also, there are a 
large number of supporting organizations and they hold a lot of assets.259 
These rules are additionally fairly well confined to a narrow circumstance 
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that mostly sophisticated taxpayers will encounter. Thus, legislating here, if 
sufficiently focused could be a real help. 
It is difficult to assess whether these rules will help in terms of 
compliance and regulation. The overall mix seems to significantly 
complicate both compliance and regulation. This may be a good thing. Rules 
prohibiting loans to substantial contributors are bright line rules that are easy 
to comply with and easy to apply. Rules that require a supporting 
organization to provide notice to its supporting organizations are also 
common sense easy to apply rules. These are transparent and likely work 
toward the intended goal of the law. It is also possible that imposing a payout 
requirement on certain Type III supporting organizations reduced complexity 
because it eliminates uncertainty for grantmaking organizations. However, 
the payout regulations themselves are highly complex too. The other 
additional rules tended to add total requirements to the already complex 
system. 
The most likely problem with these rules is that they might have been 
designed to stop the charitable abuse of yesterday rather than today. They 
were built to stop abuses Congress observed anecdotally. If that is the case, 
then these rules unnecessarily complicated the law without pushing more 
money to charitable purposes. 
These rules are also an example of the politics of rulemaking. Because 
Congress did not have the political capital to pass a statute imposing a 
significant payout requirement on Type III supporting organizations, it 
instead asked the IRS to determine that amount. Ultimately that became a 
political problem for the President’s administration, and again, politically, 
the payout was set at a very low level. 
Given the complexity involved in regulating these organizations, it is 
likely that instead of maintaining the structure in full, the best solution here 
was to eliminate Type III supporting organizations, and significantly reduce 
complexity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a strong political desire to stop abuses of charitable 
organizations through the IRS. Congress is inclined to pass legislation that 
appears tough on those who abuse charities. But, Congress can cause harm 
to the regulation of the charitable sector when it enacts detailed rules 
regarding charitable purpose. Although a congressman may find problems in 
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the sector, the congressman should be reticent to enact rules. He should allow 
the system to develop organically instead. He should stick to standards and 
generally stay away from rules at the statutory level. However, if the 
congressman wants to enact rules, he should look for discrete acts and broad 
application. 
The complexity, diversity, and the changing nature of the charitable 
ideal suggest that standards should rule charitable tax law. Additionally, that 
the charitable ideal is based in part on supporting diverse and new ideas 
commends the use of standards. Rules defining charitable purpose are likely 
to cut off this diversity-enhancing goal of the charitable ideal. However, a 
number of factors point toward rules. There are a large number of charitable 
organizations and many are unsophisticated. Providing rules in this context 
could ensure greater compliance. The sophisticated charities have significant 
amounts of money. Again, it might be worth the upfront costs to generate 
rules for these organizations given the dollars involved. Finally, and maybe 
most importantly enforcement resources are not adequate for oversight. 
Rules may be the only way to make the lack of enforcement resources 
functional. Thus, despite the initial sense that rules are not ideal to govern 
the charitable ideal, they are needed to make oversight possible. 
While these factors point in different directions, in order to best maintain 
the charitable ideal, Congress should generally stick to standards for legal 
commands regarding charitable purpose. It should allow the IRS to enact 
flexible rules that are informed by its daily case-by-case analysis. To 
maintain that flexibility, the IRS should stick to more flexible forms of 
guidance such as revenue rulings and procedures rather than regulations. 
These conclusions regarding who should enact rules and what form those 
rules should take are based on a rules versus standards analysis alone. To 
make a more informed conclusion we need a thorough analysis of the issue 
of delegation by Congress in the charitable tax law arena and the degree of 
deference courts should extend to different forms of charitable tax law 
guidance. These issues are beyond the scope of this article though. 
This analysis, however, does suggest that Congress can usefully enact 
rules on discrete acts of charitable organization personnel. Thus, Congress 
would be well advised to enact rules for political campaign intervention and 
matters related to inurement. Additionally, Congress should consider 
enacting some rules that it applied only to credit counseling organizations 
more broadly. For instance, the requirement of a community board could be 
usefully extended to all charitable organizations. Only applying it to one 
narrow sector likely causes harm to charitable law generally. Additionally, 
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Congress should consider whether relatively easily administered procedural 
rules, such as the CHNA requirement imposed on hospitals, would be a 
positive move for oversight and compliance. Given that there is already 
substantial reporting on Form 990, it is hard to imagine additional reporting 
could have this effect, but it is worth consideration because of its easy use. 
These recommendations are no panacea for charitable organization 
oversight. The only claim here is that this best balances the current oversight 
and compliance environment challenges. It also makes the claim that efforts 
to improve oversight by enacting new restrictive rules on charitable purpose 
can be expected to backfire. 
Finally, to make this recommendation work, the IRS needs to allocate 
more resources towards enacting useful publicly available rules on matters 
of charitable purpose. The IRS tends to move slowly. It will have to do better 
in this regard. But, a message of this article is that spending its resources in 
this way is likely to pay dividends to the IRS on the enforcement end. 
